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ARTICLES




Three intermediate appellate courts in Texas have held that corporate ac-
tors—directors, officers, managers, shareholders, and probably common em-
ployees and agents—are immune from personal liability for fraud that they
themselves commit as long as their deceit relates to or arises from a contrac-
tual obligation of the corporation. Similar actors in limited liability companies
also enjoy immunity. These courts do not require that the business entities
themselves be liable for the fraud. When the entities are not liable, these new
holdings leave fraud victims no remedy at all, even if a jury would find fraud.
One (or maybe two) Texas appellate courts have held otherwise. The Supreme
Court of Texas will probably decide the issue, and one justice has already
signed on.
To date, these decisions have only been noticed in print by a few practicing
attorneys. No commentator has questioned them. But the decisions are wrong.
These courts claim to be following a statute, but the statute does not support
the courts’ analysis. Nor does the statute’s legislative history. Surprising (and
probably unnoticed) results strongly suggest the legislature never intended this
reading. And what rationale could justify it? Fraud is the economic equivalent
of theft. Practitioner comments on the decisions suggest that the cost of litigat-
ing fraud is too high. Texas’s reputation for pro-business policies might sug-
gest this move is just helpful de-regulation, but it is not. Policing fraud is the
only way to make markets safe for freedom of contract, and litigating fraud
claims is the courts’ role. These decisions should be abandoned before they
become the law in all of Texas and elsewhere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent appellate cases in Houston and one in El Paso (and an
older one in Texarkana) have held that corporate actors—directors,
officers, managers, shareholders, and probably common employees
and agents—are immune from personal liability for the fraud and mis-
representation these actors commit as long as the deceit relates to or
arises from a contractual obligation of the corporation.1 Similar actors
in limited liability companies also enjoy immunity. Courts do not re-
quire that the companies themselves be liable for such fraud. When
the company is not liable, the law leaves fraud victims no remedy at
all.
In each of these cases, the claim against the corporate actor has
been brought by someone to whom the corporation owes money. The
1. The cases are Hong v. Havey, 551 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2018, no pet.), and TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Group, Inc., 527 S.W.3d
589 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The recent El Paso case is Valley
Forge Motor Co. v. Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).
Another case was decided in 2001 in Texarkana. Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28
S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). A federal district court in Dallas
also adopted the position in an unpublished decision. See Saeed v. Bennett-Fouch
Assocs., LLC, No. 3:11-cv-01134-F, 2012 WL 13026741, at *2–4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28,
2012).
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corporation’s contract counterparty has sued the corporation2 but also
sued the corporate actor for fraud. The personal claim may be moti-
vated by vendetta, leverage, or justice and a hope of recovery, but
usually the corporate actor and her attorney believe the corporate ac-
tor should not be sued individually for something she did as part of
her job. As nearly as I can tell (see Part V), and based on endorse-
ments from practicing attorneys, the courts’ reading of the statute is
an attempt to support the understanding of the corporate actor’s
lawyer.
These courts claim to be following a statute (set out in Part II) that
on its face addresses veil-piercing.3 The courts claim that the legisla-
ture slipped some language in without fanfare or announcement (or
even suggestion4) in 1997 that actually creates a broad immunity from
liability for fraud connected to a contract in any way by anyone in the
named group of business actors.5 No court seemed to notice this pro-
vision until 2001 (the Texarkana case),6 and after that not until 2017,
when a Houston intermediate appellate court decided to adopt this
immunity in a case in which it had not been argued by counsel.7 I
describe the Houston cases in detail in Part III. They were decided by
the 14th Court of Appeals, called affectionately here “the 14th.” The
14th’s opinions are the most cogent defense of this new position—this
reading of the statute. Now the El Paso appellate court has decided to
follow the 14th. The court of appeals in Corpus Christi (and perhaps
the one in San Antonio) has declined to follow.8 The Supreme Court
of Texas will probably decide the issue. One judge who signed on in
the 14th now sits on the Supreme Court of Texas (Busby).9 Perhaps
this theory will cover all of Texas.
2. Except in the El Paso case in which only the individual was sued. See Sifuentes,
595 S.W.3d at 871.
3. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.223–.225 (West 2019).
4. Nothing in the bill analysis of the 1997 amendments mentions anything like
this. See House Comm. on Bus. & Indus., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 555, 75th Leg., R.S.
(1997). The introduced, Senate, and House bill analyses are all equally bland and
empty in this respect. All are available at Texas Legislature Online.
5. See Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d at 877–78; Havey, 551 S.W.3d at 883; TecLogistics,
527 S.W.3d at 599–600.
6. See Mecom, 28 S.W.3d at 136–38.
7. See TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 603. The Houston opinions do not mention
Mecom, 28 S.W.3d at 129, the case from Texarkana.
8. See Kingston v. Helm, 82 S.W.3d 755, 764–67 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2002, pet. denied); see also Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (purporting to follow Kingston to impose individ-
ual liability). A federal district court in Dallas also declined to follow the position,
after a detailed discussion. See Bates Energy Oil & Gas v. Complete Oilfield Servs.,
361 F. Supp. 3d 633, 664–74 (W.D. Tex. 2019). Bates contains a particularly thoughtful
discussion of Texas precedent. See id.
9. See Supreme Court, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/
about-the-court/ [https://perma.cc/LKN3-VDK7]. Justice Busby did not write but sat
on the panel that decided TecLogistics.
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For now, however, Houston is a large commercial jurisdiction, and
these decisions exempt quite a lot of fraud from liability. If the theory
spreads across the state, quite a lot more fraud will be exempt.
The cases are troubling for several reasons. First, the statute does
not support the courts’ reading. Parts III (describing the cases) and
IV.A show how the courts have misread the statute. The statute’s
plain language limits it to veil-piercing claims. The courts have picked
out from the statute the language they are applying and disregarded
the rest. The courts have also read into the legislative history an intent
that is not there.
The courts also have failed to consider several disturbing and cer-
tainly unintended results of this reading of the statute. For instance,
the courts’ reading of the statute enables fraud and sometimes makes
fraud pay, as Part IV.B and Part IV.C.2 show. How could it not pay,
for the individual tortfeasor? She has literally gotten away with fraud.
Part IV.C lists additional results. For instance,
• the statute limits personal liability for fraud but not for the far
less serious offense of negligence;
• if the statute limits the liability of these corporate actors for
fraud against corporate obligees, the statute also limits the per-
sonal liability of these same corporate actors for frauds they
commit against the corporation itself—against their own
employers;
• if an employee or agent commits fraud and renders the em-
ployer liable vicariously, the employer is unable under the 14th’s
reading to seek indemnity from the employee;
• immunity from personal liability for fraud becomes under this
theory purchasable for the price of a share of stock; and
• the reading of the statute oddly grants to corporate and LLC
actors an immunity not available to any other business person,
no matter what other kind of business or business entity they
may work with.
Both the individual and cumulative effects of these results persuade
that the Texas Legislature intended no such result. No such result
comes from this statute’s language.
The Texas courts already do not follow the veil-piercing statutes as
they are written.10 Their results mock these statutes and make it im-
10. See generally Val Ricks, The Twisted Veil of Texas LLCs, 46 TEX. J. BUS. LAW
67 (2014). Section 101.002(a) of the Texas Business Organizations Code states that the
corporate veil-piercing statutes are applicable to limited liability companies “[s]ubject
to Section 101.114,” and Section 101.114’s only language limits a member or man-
ager’s liability for entity obligations. To be subject to Section 101.114 means veil-
piercing is not allowed. Moreover, Section 101.113 prohibits a lawsuit in which both
the LLC and a member are parties, unless “the action is brought to enforce the mem-
ber’s right against or liability to the company.” TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 101.113 (West 2019). Virtually all veil-piercing suits involving LLCs make the LLC
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possible for lawyers to know from the code what courts will do.11 This
latest reading of the corporate code has a similar effect, and in addi-
tion overturns—alone, as no other state does this—fundamental rules
of tort and agency law upon which trust necessary for business activi-
ties and freedom of contract thrive. According to comments from
practicing attorneys, these courts have decided to stop policing fraud
in favor of cutting back on litigation. Policing fraud is hard, and some-
times it is expensive, but if the courts are unwilling to do the hard
work, the cost of doing business in Texas will increase, and this will
harm Texas, its people, and those who do business with them. Part V
addresses possible policy justifications for the recent reading of the
statute, and not surprisingly finds nothing very persuasive. Fraud is
theft, and protecting against it is vital to the protection of property
rights and the trust necessary for freedom of contract.
The literature has not yet taken notice of these decisions or of this
kind of development, which appears to be a unique experiment.
II. THE STATUTE
The statute which the 14th claims creates a personal business fraud
exemption reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in
shares, . . . or any affiliate of such a holder [or] owner . . . may not
be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to: . . .
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the
holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate is or was the alter ego of
the corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a
sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory; or
(3) any obligation of the corporation on the basis of the failure of
the corporation to observe any corporate formality, including the
failure to:
(A) comply with this code or the certificate of formation or
bylaws of the corporation; or
(B) observe any requirement prescribed by this code or the cer-
tificate of formation or bylaws of the corporation for acts to be
taken by the corporation or its directors or shareholders.
(b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a
holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates
that the holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate caused the corpora-
tion to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate
an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal ben-
efit of the holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate.12
The statute follows up with Section 21.224, which holds,
and member party defendants, the very thing the code prohibits. See Ricks, supra
note 10, at 72–74.
11. See generally Ricks, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
12. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223.
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The liability of a holder, beneficial owner, . . . or any affiliate of such
a holder, owner, . . . or of the corporation for an obligation that is
limited by Section 21.223 is exclusive and preempts any other liabil-
ity imposed for that obligation under common law or otherwise.13
Section 21.225 clarifies that Sections 21.223 and 21.224 do not affect
liability expressly assumed or imposed by some other statute.14 Affili-
ate is a defined term; it “means a person who controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with another person.”15 Affiliate ap-
pears to include managers of many closely held business entities. It
probably also includes agents of business entities, as these are subject
to the entity’s control.
The courts and commentators have been quite clear that the intent
of this statute was to reverse the effect of Castleberry v. Branscum,16 a
veil-piercing decision that many lawyers thought set forth loose stan-
dards, opening shareholders to too great a threat of liability.17 The
original statutory response was drafted “to eliminate constructive
fraud as a basis for holding shareholders liable for contractual obliga-
tions of a corporation.”18 The statute was not entirely successful, and
the statute was amended in 1993 and 1997 to shore up the protec-
tion.19 The 1993 amendment added the exclusivity language of Section
21.224.20 The 1997 amendment added “any affiliate” and broadened
the language now found in Section 21.223(a)(2) to include “any matter
relating to or arising from” a contractual obligation.21 The statute was
adopted from the Texas Business Corporations Act without significant
language change into the Texas Business Organizations Code
(“TBOC”) when the TBOC was passed in 2003.22
A separate legislative act supposedly applies this statute to LLCs.23
The applicability of the veil-piercing doctrine to LLCs in Texas is any-
13. Id. § 21.224.
14. Id. § 21.225.
15. Id. § 1.002(1).
16. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
17. See, e.g., 13 Elizabeth S. Miller & Robert A. Ragazzo, Texas Practice Series:
Texas Methods of Practice §§ 46:2–46:3 (2016 ed.) (describing pre-Castleberry law,
Castleberry itself, its aftermath, and the legislative response); James C. Chadwick,
Corporations and Partnerships, 41 SW. L.J. 201, 220–21 (1987); Paul S. Leslie, Corpo-
rations—Disregarding Corporate Entity—in Suit by Contract Creditor, Corporate En-
tity May Be Disregarded upon Showing of Constructive Fraud when Entity Used as
Sham to Perpetrate a Fraud, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1441, 1443–45 (1987).
18. Alan R. Bromberg, Byron F. Egan, Dan L. Nicewander & Robert S. Trotti,
The Role of the Business Law Section and the Texas Business Law Foundation in the
Development of Texas Business Law, 41 TEX. J. BUS. L. 41, 64 (2005).
19. See Miller & Ragazzo, supra note 17, § 46:3.
20. See infra Part IV.A.4, which includes the bill language from the 1997
amendment.
21. Id.
22. Compare Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 64, art. 2.21, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 239, 252 (amended 1997) (expired Jan. 1, 2010) with TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.223–.225 (West 2019).
23. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.002.
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thing but clear if the LLC statutes mean anything at all,24 but if veil
piercing against an LLC member or manager is possible, it probably
would have to proceed on the same principles as it would against a
corporate shareholder or manager.25
The personal business fraud exemption rests, according to the 14th,
on certain language of the statute, specifically this language:
(a) A holder of shares . . . , or any affiliate of such a holder . . . or of
the corporation, may not be held liable to . . . [the corporation’s]
obligees with respect to . . .
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation . . . on the basis of actual
or constructive fraud . . . .26
This language and Section 21.224’s proclamation of exclusivity pro-
vide a limit for shareholders and affiliates—that is the 14th’s claim,
anyway. Section 101.002 of the TBOC instructs us, when dealing with
an LLC, to insert LLC terms in place of the corporation terms.27 If we
do, the applicable law would read as follows:
(a) A member or any affiliate of such a member or of the limited
liability company may not be held liable to the limited liability com-
pany’s obligees with respect to . . .
(2) any contractual obligation of the limited liability company or
any matter relating to or arising from the obligation . . . on the
basis of actual or constructive fraud . . . .28
This language appears to have the effect claimed by the 14th. So long
as the fraud arises from or relates to a contractual obligation of the
business,29 the shareholder, member, or affiliate will not be liable for
it to an obligee of the entity on the basis of actual or constructive
24. See supra note 10.
25. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.002.
26. Id. § 21.223(a).
27. Id. § 101.002.
28. Id. § 21.223 through the lens of § 101.002. The translation is not literal. Subsec-
tion (a) of 21.223 refers to a “holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in
shares.” Section 101.002 says, literally, that “[f]or purposes of the application of Sub-
section (a): (1) a reference to shares includes ‘membership interests’; (2) a reference
to ‘holder,’ ‘owner,’ or ‘shareholder’ includes a ‘member’ . . . ; (3) a reference to
‘corporation’ or ‘corporate’ includes a ‘limited liability company’ . . . .” Id.
§ 101.002(b). Applied literally, Section 101.002(b) requires that Section 21.223(a)
read, “A member of membership interests, a member of any beneficial interest in
membership interests,” and so on, which makes no sense at all. But the intent of
Section 101.002 is perhaps clear enough that Sections “21.223 [and] 21.224 . . . apply to
a limited liability company and the company’s members, owners, . . . affiliates.” Sense
at least can be made of this, and I have tried to do so in the text.
29. The phrase is “magic words” found in innumerable arbitration, forum-selec-
tion, and governing-law provisions. E.g., KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE
FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING ¶ 13.38 (4th ed. 2017). The clause is also recommended by
the American Arbitration Association. See Clauses, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://
www.adr.org/Clauses [https://perma.cc/35NK-C879]. It is the “relating to” language
that broadens the clause. See ADAMS, supra note 29, at ¶¶ 13.41–.45.
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fraud—that is the court’s claim. If subsection (a) applies, then a court
also has to examine whether subsection (b) applies to allow liability. If
the statute is read to apply this way, then the 14th claims that Section
21.224 says that there is no other way to make the shareholder or
member liable. Thus, the court says, it is following the statute’s “plain
language.”30
The court is mistaken. The 14th’s reading of the statute is incorrect
for a number of reasons introduced in Part III and fully discussed in
Part IV. Part III examines the two cases in which the 14th has applied
the statute in this way. The discussion shows the effect of this reading,
which has been used twice now to avoid jury verdicts in favor of fraud
victims and quite literally let business people get away with fraud. Af-
ter Part III’s illustration, Part IV will explain further how the 14th’s
theory goes astray.
III. THE HOUSTON CASES
A. TecLogistics
The 14th first adopted this reading in TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-
Rand Group, Inc.31 The case involved fraud in the performance of a
contract.
Dresser-Rand employed TecLogistics to send items to and from
Dresser-Rand’s customers.32 TecLogistics “commonly subcontracted
its work to Pentagon Freight Services,” however.33 TecLogistics would
then submit a subcontractor invoice to Dresser-Rand: Dresser-Rand
“required TecLogistics to ‘back up’ the charges by submitting Penta-
gon’s invoices” with its own.34 Dresser-Rand paid the “passed-through
charges.”35 TecLogistics’s president Josephine Treurniet created fake
Pentagon invoices with higher-than-actual charges, then submitted
them to Dresser-Rand to justify overcharging for TecLogistics’s ser-
vices.36 Dresser-Rand paid the padded bills.37
30. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 596–97 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Saeed v. Bennett-Fouch Assocs.,
LLC, No. 3:11-cv-01134-F, 2012 WL 13026741, at *2–4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2012)
(claiming to construe the statute according to “the plain and common meaning of its
words”); Technicool Sys., Inc. v. WorldFab, Inc. (In re Technicool Sys., Inc.), 594 B.R.
663, 671 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2018) (noting in dicta that the “plain language” of the
statute seems to fit an individual fraud claim but rejecting that result on the basis of
other Texas precedent).
31. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 599–600.




36. Id. at 594.
37. Id.
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Dresser-Rand sued both TecLogistics and Treurniet for common
law fraud.38 Treurniet “admitted at trial . . . that she had created the
false Pentagon invoices to back up” the overcharges.39 A jury found
that TecLogistics had committed fraud on these facts, a conclusion
that the court of appeals affirmed.40 Treurniet was, by her own admis-
sion, the only human agent to act for TecLogistics with regard to the
fraud.41 Treurniet committed common law fraud.42 But the trial court
refused to let the jury hear the fraud claim against Treurniet and or-
dered that Dresser-Rand “take nothing” from Treurniet,43 meaning
that Treurniet was not liable for fraud.44 The court of appeals affirmed
on the basis that the statute barred the claim.45
There is nothing remarkable about the court’s reasoning. In the fol-
lowing columns, we can see how the court matched up the facts to the
statute’s language:
38. Id. at 592. Dresser-Rand obtained copies of Pentagon’s actual invoices. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 592–93, 594–95, 598. The court explained,
Dresser-Rand alleged actual fraud. This allegation also was supported by the
evidence: Treurniet knew what Pentagon actually charged, but she admit-
tedly created the false Pentagon invoices, and she personally signed the
TecLogistics’ invoices incorporating the knowing misrepresentations. She
admits that no one else at TecLogistics was involved in creating and tender-
ing the invoices. Treurniet, then, was the human agent through which TecLo-
gistics committed actual fraud against Dresser-Rand.
Id. at 598.
41. Id. at 596, 594.
42. In a separate place, the court of appeals admitted that Dresser-Rand’s fraud
allegation against Treurniet was supported by the evidence:
Treurniet knew what Pentagon actually charged, but she admittedly created
the false Pentagon invoices, and she personally signed the TecLogistics’ in-
voices incorporating the knowing misrepresentations. She admits that no
one else at TecLogistics was involved in creating and tendering the invoices.
Treurniet, then, was the human agent through which TecLogistics committed
actual fraud against Dresser-Rand.
Id. at 598.
43. Id. at 592–93.
44. See VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd. v. Gross, No. 05-16-01041-CV, 2017 WL
3405312, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bhatia v. Wood-
lands N. Hous. Heart Ctr., PLLC, 396 S.W.3d 658, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (explaining that “successfully defending on the main action”
would typically “mean obtaining a take-nothing judgment on the main issue or issues
in the case”).
45. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 598.
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(a) A holder of shares . . . , or any TecLogistics “is a corporation.”46
affiliate of such a holder . . . or of the Treurniet “is TecLogistics’ owner and
corporation, president”; both parties referred to
her as “owner” or having an “owner-
ship interest.”47 This made her both
shareholder and affiliate.48
may not be held liable to . . . [the cor- Dresser-Rand was an obligee of
poration’s] obligees TecLogistics; TecLogistics owed it
services pursuant to contract.49
with respect to . . . (2) any contrac- TecLogistics was obliged by contract
tual obligation of the corporation or to “provide documentation” support-
any matter relating to or arising from ing its charges.50
the obligation . . .
on the basis that the holder . . . or The claim against Treurniet was
affiliate is or was the alter ego of the actual fraud, and the evidence clearly
corporation or on the basis of actual supported the claim.52
or constructive fraud, a sham to per-
petrate a fraud, or other similar the-
ory . . . .”51
I have simplified the last element so that you see what the court did.
The court’s analysis of the last element is less clear than these columns
make it, however. This part of the statute—“on the basis . . . ”— is in
fact clearly contrary to the court’s analysis, yet the court treats it as
plainly precluding a shareholder’s liability. This is where the court’s
analysis goes most obviously astray. The clause in its entirety (and to
the court’s credit, it quotes the whole clause) contains a list of theo-
46. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a) (West 2019).
47. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 597.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 598.
51. Id. The court adds more words but no additional substance in a long passage:
This required connection between individual liability and corporate contrac-
tual obligation, too, is satisfied. TecLogistics’ contractual obligations to
Dresser-Rand were not only to forward freight to and from Dresser-Rand’s
customers, but also to provide documentation to Dresser-Rand to support its
charges. As Hart explained, Dresser-Rand requires documentation to sup-
port a freight-forwarder’s invoice because the company typically passes
freight-forwarding charges through to the customer, and Dresser-Rand
“ha[s] to provide invoice and documentation when we bill the client showing
what those charges are.” To ensure the accuracy of those charges, a freight-
forwarder’s invoice and its supporting documentation is first reviewed by
Dresser-Rand’s accounts-payable department to see that they match. The
same review is repeated by those responsible for supply-chain management.
Dresser-Rand additionally conducts internal audits to ensure that the docu-
mentation is in order.
Id. at 597–98.
52. Id. at 598.
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ries: “on the basis that the holder . . . is or was the alter ego of the
corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory.”53 The theories are theo-
ries of veil piercing, and all were mentioned in Castleberry.54 Veil
piercing is a theory of “derivative liability”55 because it imposes on
shareholders and other corporate controllers the liability of the corpo-
ration; their liability is derived from the corporation’s liability. Be-
cause “alter ego” is also a theory of derivative liability and also was
mentioned in Castleberry,56 the most natural reading of “other similar
theory” in the statute is that it includes “alter ego.”57 But even if only
the theories in the second “on the basis” clause are referred to by the
words “other similar,” all of these are veil-piercing theories—theories
of derivative liability. The theories remain current today as veil-pierc-
ing theories.58 Veil-piercing theories are what the statute names.59
Treurniet was charged with the tort of “actual fraud,” but not the
veil-piercing theory.60 The veil-piercing theory and the tort have the
same name and concern with intentional deception, but that is all. The
53. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)(2) (West 2007).
54. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272–73 (Tex. 1986); see also
Rose v. Intercontinental Bank, N.A., 705 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Basing a claim of alter ego on fraudulent intent is only
one manner to establish the claim.”); Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 385 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref’d, n.r.e.) (describing alter ego, fraud, and constructive
fraud). Castleberry defined actual fraud but did not name a veil-piercing theory that
required it; Castleberry held that constructive fraud was sufficient even without show-
ing actual fraud. 721 S.W.2d at 273. It is implausible, however, that Castleberry meant
to allow veil-piercing for constructive fraud but not for actual fraud, a more culpable
act. Castleberry’s naming “fraud” as a ground for veil-piercing clearly intended to
include both.
55. The phrase comes from Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 273 (Tex. 2006).
56. See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
57. See Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 273 (“We hold that characterizing the theory as ‘rati-
fication’ rather than ‘alter ego’ is simply asserting a ‘similar theory’ of derivative lia-
bility that is covered by the statute.”); Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 (“[A]lter ego is
only one of the bases for disregarding the corporate fiction.” “The basis used here to
disregard the corporate fiction . . . is separate from alter ego.”); id. at 278 (Gonzalez,
J., dissenting) (“Castleberry . . . had to produce some evidence either under an alter
ego theory or under a use of the corporate entity as a sham to perpetrate a fraud
theory.”); Lucas v. Texas Indus., 696 S.W.2d 372, 374–75 (Tex. 1984) (employing “al-
ter ego” as a general name for all veil-piercing or derivative shareholder liability theo-
ries). On this, Glenn West agrees. See Glenn D. West & Susan Y. Chao, Corporations,
56 S.M.U. L. REV. 1395, 1407 (2003) (“The phrase ‘or other similar theory’ does not
relate only to alter ego—a piercing the corporate veil theory—but to ‘actual fraud,’
‘constructive fraud,’ and ‘a sham to perpetrate a fraud.’”).
58. E.g., Endsley Elec., Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 15, 22–23 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2012, no pet.).
59. Bates Energy Oil & Gas v. Complete Oilfield Services, 361 F. Supp. 3d 633,
673–74 (W.D. Tex. 2019), engaged in a similar analysis and reached the same
conclusion.
60. At least, only claims for fraud and (against TecLogistics) breach of contract
remained at the time of trial. See TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527
S.W.3d 589, 596–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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veil-piercing claim is established by showing that “the corporate form
has been used as part of a basically unfair device to achieve an inequi-
table result,”61 and one way to show unfairness or inequity is by what
Castleberry called actual fraud: “dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive.”62 Courts agreed that this kind of misuse of the corporate
form would warrant piercing the corporate veil,63 and courts since
have mostly agreed that the veil-piercing theory named in Section
21.223(a)(2) does not require a showing of the elements of the tort
(which would make veil-piercing largely beside the point); nor does
subsection (b), which preserves actual fraud as a ground for veil-pierc-
ing, require a showing of the elements of the common law tort of
fraud.64 Unlike the veil-piercing theory, the tort of course requires
that the five elements of the tort of actual fraud be proved.65 The
TecLogistics court in effect conflated these two theories, claiming that
61. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex.
2008) (quoting Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271).
62. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 273 (quoting Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740
(Tex. 1964)).
63. See supra note 54. R
64. See Spring St. Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2013);
Ritz v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 513 B.R. 510, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“Within the meaning of
the Business Organizations Code for piercing the corporate veil regarding a contrac-
tual obligation, ‘actual fraud’ . . . ‘involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive.”’); Ogbonna v. USPLabs, LLC, No. EP-13-CV-347-KC, 2014 WL 2592097, at
*8–12 (W.D. Tex. June 10, 2014) (“Actual fraud, in this context, involves dishonesty of
purpose or intent to deceive, and is not equivalent to the tort of fraud.”); Maxwell v.
Neri N. Am., No. 4:13-cv-269, 2014 WL 2441200, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2014);
Weston Grp., Inc. v. Sw. Home Health Care, LP, No. 3:12-CV-1964-G, 2014 WL
940329, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2014); Ward Family Found. v. Arnette (In re
Arnette), 454 B.R. 663, 694–95 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (“In the context of piercing
the corporate veil, the concept of ‘actual fraud’ contained in section 21.223 is not the
same as the common law tort of fraud . . . .”); R&M Mixed Beverage Consultants, Inc.
v. Safe Harbor Benefits, Inc., 578 S.W.3d 218, 231 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.);
AvenueOne Props., Inc. v. KP5 Ltd. P’ship, 540 S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2018, no pet.); U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., 555
S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Weaver & Tidwell,
L.L.P. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA, 427 S.W.3d 559, 574 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, no pet.); Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548, 556 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, no pet.); Metroplex Mailing Servs., LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons
Co., 410 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Tryco Enters., Inc. v.
Robinson, 390 S.W.3d 497, 508 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Shook
v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied); Latham v.
Burgher, 320 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“[I]n the context of
piercing the corporate veil, actual fraud is not equivalent to the tort of fraud. Instead,
in that context, actual fraud involves ‘dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive.’”);
Dick’s Last Resort W. End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d 905, 908–09 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Solutioneers Consulting, Ltd. v. Gulf Greyhound Part-
ners, Ltd., 237 S.W.3d 379, 387–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.);
Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
65. Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018) (“Fraudulent induce-
ment is a species of common-law fraud that shares the same basic elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or asserted without
knowledge of its truth, (3) made with the intention that it should be acted on by the
other party, (4) which the other party relied on and (5) which caused injury.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-1\TWL104.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-OCT-20 7:24
2020] FRAUD IS NOW LEGAL IN TEXAS 13
Treurniet’s liability was “based on” one when it was actually based on
the other. Treurniet was charged with the common law tort of fraud.
The person who drafted the court’s analysis seems to know the dif-
ference between the two theories but tried to paper over the differ-
ence nonetheless. Notwithstanding that the case against Treurniet was
brought for common law fraud, when the court tried to define “actual
fraud,” it ignored the elements of the tort and used instead the lan-
guage that Castleberry used to describe the veil-piercing theory: “usu-
ally involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive.”66 The court
then analyzed whether Dresser-Rand alleged that Treurniet had done
this. Of course, the complaint did make such an allegation, because
conduct involving intent to deceive describes some—but not all—of
the elements of the common law tort of fraud.67
But the basis of Treurniet’s liability was not merely that she en-
gaged in conduct that involved “dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive.” The conduct described by this phrase is not itself tortious.
No common law fraud liability exists for a dishonest intention.
Treurniet could not have been found personally liable for anything on
the basis the court named unless it was a reference to a more complete
theory. What the court named is a partial description of a veil-piercing
theory.
The actual basis of Treurniet’s liability was that she had committed
a tort—that she had committed all the elements of the common law
tort of fraud. The tort has five elements, all of which must be proved.68
That tort is neither referred to nor included in the veil-piercing theory
the court named.
The common law tort of fraud is simply not an “other similar the-
ory” to the theories of veil-piercing listed in Section 21.223(a)(2). It is
not a theory of veil-piercing at all. The court failed to read “actual . . .
fraud” in light of “other similar theory.” In this respect, the court ig-
nored the plain meaning of the statute. The court also conflated for
purposes of the phrase “on the basis of” (i) “actual . . . fraud” the veil-
piercing theory and (ii) the tort of actual fraud.
Of course, Dresser-Rand objected that Treurniet was liable under
the common law tort of fraud. In response, the court cited Section
21.224, which provides that “liability . . . ‘for an obligation that is lim-
ited by Section 21.223 is exclusive and preempts any other liability
imposed for that obligation under common law or otherwise.’”69 Sec-
tion 21.224 as written depends entirely on what “is limited by Section
66. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 598 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
67. See Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 614.
68. See id.
69. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 598–99 (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.224 (West)). The court did not explain why Section 21.224 was needed; Section
21.223 is a statute, too, and all statutes control over the common law.
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21.223,” however. What Section 21.223 limits is, as shown, only “liabil-
ity . . . on the basis” of a veil-piercing theory. Thus, in Section 21.224,
the only “liability . . . ‘for an obligation that is limited by Section
21.223’” is liability for a corporate obligation under a veil-piercing
theory.70 If Section 21.223 actually applied to Treurniet’s liability, both
Sections 21.223 and 21.224 might have barred it. But Section 21.223
does not limit personal liability on the basis of tort law for the torts
one commits, so the obligation to pay a remedy for the torts one com-
mits—which has an entirely different basis than the liability addressed
by Section 21.223—is not limited or preempted by either Section
21.223 or Section 21.224. The language of Section 21.224 has not been
literally applied (and is somewhat mysterious),71 but given Section
70. Section 21.224 equates 21.223’s “liability” with “an obligation.” Section
21.224’s phrase is “liability . . . for an obligation that is limited by Section 21.223”:
“The liability of a holder . . . or any affiliate . . . for an obligation that is limited by
Section 21.223 is exclusive and preempts any other liability imposed for that obliga-
tion under the common law or otherwise.” TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.224
(West). However, the only “obligation” addressed by Section 21.223 is a “contractual
obligation of the corporation” in (a)(2) and an “obligation of the corporation” in
(a)(3). Nothing in Section 21.223 limits these obligation(s). Section 21.223 instead lim-
its liability: “may not be held liable . . . with respect to . . . any contractual obligation
of the corporation . . . or any obligation of the corporation . . . .” The switch in Section
21.224 is confusing, but the language of Section 21.224 makes sense if a liability lim-
ited in Section 21.223 becomes in Section 21.224 “an obligation that is limited by
Section 21.223” or, perhaps better and more true to Section 21.224’s language, “liabil-
ity-for-an-obligation that is limited by Section 21.223,” as Section 21.223 limits only
derivative liability.
71. Besides the conflation of “liability” and “obligation” mentioned previously,
see supra note 70, Section 21.224 pretends to preempt something that Section 21.223 R
itself does not disturb, and courts have never read it literally. Section 21.224 says,
“The liability of a holder . . . or . . . affiliate . . . for an obligation that is limited by
Section 21.223 is exclusive.” Meaning what? The shareholder is exclusively liable for
such things? That is unlikely; Section 21.223 does not purport to limit the corpora-
tion’s liability for its own obligations, and no court has held this. So Section 21.224’s
exclusivity claim is not literally true as applied and probably was not intended.
Perhaps Section 21.224 means to say that Section 21.223’s method of reaching the
shareholder or other corporate actor for a corporate obligation is exclusive. Saying
that Section 21.223 is the exclusive way of reaching shareholders for this purpose is an
imaginative reconstruction consistent with Section 21.223’s purpose. That reconstruc-
tion is also consistent with the rest of Section 21.224, which claims, “The liability of a
[shareholder or affiliate] . . . for an obligation that is limited by Section 21.223 . . .
preempts any other liability imposed for that obligation under the common law or
otherwise.” However, that reconstruction has also never been true in fact. Section
21.223 does not set out a way to reach a shareholder; it is merely negative—it only
imposes some limitations on methods already existing. Saying that merely negative
language is “exclusive and preempts any other liability” does not even make logical
sense. Section 21.223 as written does not even pretend to preempt all common law in
the area, and Section 21.224 cannot make Section 21.223 do something it clearly can-
not do. For instance, Section (a)(2) does not purport to touch veil-piercing liability for
tort obligations, and (a)(3) does not disrupt that liability much, only forbidding the
use of “corporate formalities” in the court’s analysis. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.223(a)(2)–(3) (West). Section 21.223 otherwise leaves common law or equitable
veil-piercing for tort liability intact, as the courts have recognized and apply. See Dur-
ham v. Accardi, 587 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)
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21.224’s dependence on Section 21.223, any attempt to use Section
21.224 to add content to Section 21.223 is circular, just bootstrapping.
Section 21.225 is likewise limited in effect, and the actual language
of Section 21.225 confirms that Sections 21.223 and 21.224 are limited
to veil-piercing liability. Section 21.225 is unfortunately titled “Excep-
tions to Limitations,”72 reflecting a phrase in the legislation that cre-
ated it, but its words do not purport to except anything and the
(citing only Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986), and other common
law for veil-piercing standards; mentioning Section 21.223 only for the proposition
that formalities are “no longer a consideration when determining an alter ego ques-
tion”); Hovel v. Batzri, 490 S.W.3d 132, 146 n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied) (“Tort creditors may seek to pierce the corporate veil under the
common law.”); MBR & Assocs., Inc. v. Lile, No. 02-11-00431-CV, 2012 WL 4661665,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 4, 2012, pet. denied) (affirming an alter ego claim
in a tort liability case on the basis of common law principles alone). Therefore, this
reconstruction of Section 21.224 simply cannot be taken as literally true; Section
21.224 does not make Section 21.223 the exclusive means of reaching shareholders
even for veil-piercing liability, nor does it preempt the common law, which is still the
method of imposing veil-piercing liability for tort even though Section 21.223 limits
the way in which the common law works. Courts continue to use the common law
theories even in cases of contractual obligation, also, again proving that Section
21.224 has never preempted anything. See, e.g., SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs.
(USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2008) (stating, “[w]e have held that the limi-
tation on liability afforded by the corporate structure can be ignored only ‘when the
corporate form has been used as part of a basically unfair device to achieve an inequi-
table result,’” and citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d 270, even though this standard is
absent from Section 21.223, as SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d 444, also discussed); Chico
Auto Parts & Serv., Inc. v. Crockett, 512 S.W.3d 560, 573 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017,
pet. denied) (rejecting a veil-piercing claim for contract-based liability on the grounds
that the plaintiff had shown no evidence of alter ego).
Fortunately, another construction of Section 21.224 is possible that is consistent
with Section 21.224’s language. In normal legal thinking, all statutes preempt the com-
mon law, so Section 21.223 can preempt the common law all on its own, without Sec-
tion 21.224’s help. What Section 21.223 cannot do, perhaps, is overcome courts’
hesitancy to allow defendants to get away with constructive fraud. Courts’ jurisdiction
in equity “to prevent absurdity applies when following a statute would require the
court to countenance a fraud.” See Ricks, supra note 10, at 69. The courts have ap-
plied this jurisdiction to cut back on the Statute of Frauds, statutes of limitation, and
others. See id. at 70; e.g., Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex. 1921) (“Eq-
uity has no concern in such cases except to prevent the perpetration of a fraud.”);
Hunt v. Turner, 9 Tex. 385, 385 (1853) (“A contract may be void under the statute of
frauds; yet if the conduct of the party setting up the invalidity of the contract has been
such as to raise an equity outside of and independent of the contract, and nothing else
will be adequate satisfaction of such equity, the sale will be sustained, though not
valid under the statute of frauds.”). Section 21.223 may be subject to the same objec-
tion as the Statute of Frauds; Section 21.223’s purpose, in fact, was to restrict veil-
piercing on grounds of constructive fraud. Section 21.224’s purpose is to tell the
courts, “We mean to do this; set equity aside to this extent.” It is Hooks and Hunt and
the like—that “common law of equity”—that Section 21.224 means Section 21.223 to
preempt and exclude.
72. “The heading of a title, subtitle, chapter, subchapter, or section does not limit
or expand the meaning of a statute.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.024 (West). The
Texas Supreme Court characterized the section as creating a “statutory exception.”
Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. 2006).
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language of exception is omitted from the TBOC.73 The Section says
merely, “Section 21.223 or 21.224 does not limit the obligation of the
holder . . . or affiliate to the obligee of the corporation if that person”
contracted for the liability or is liable for it under some other statute.74
The Code’s language is true, despite its title: Sections 21.223 and
21.224 do not limit any such thing. Because Sections 21.223 and 21.224
do not pretend to have any effect on any liability except derivative
liability “on the basis of” a veil-piercing theory, nothing in them could
have any effect on the direct contractual liability or other statutory
liability of corporate actors. Nothing in Section 21.224 or 21.225 helps
the TecLogistics court.
The TecLogistics court thought to shore up its reading with a recita-
tion of the statute’s legislative history.75 The key amendment, the
court said, occurred when the legislature in 1997 added the phrase
“any matter relating to or arising from the obligation” and included
affiliates.76 But even though the scope of contractual liability covered
by subsection 21.223(a)(2) expanded to cover contract-related liabil-
ity, the subsection still addresses only liability “on the basis of . . .
[alter ego or several other named veil-piercing theories] or other simi-
lar theory.”77 The liability that Section 21.224 preempts is only veil-
piercing liability. I address the legislative history in full in Part IV.A.4.
After holding that the statute’s prohibition applied to Dresser-
Rand’s common law fraud claim against Treurniet, the court turned to
the prohibition’s second part:
Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder
. . . or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that the holder . . . or
affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpe-
73. See Act of Feb. 26, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 215, § 2.05, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
418, 466 (expired Jan. 1, 2010) (current version at TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.223) (“except that”). The 1997 amendments also did not include any title. See Act
of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1522–23
(expired Jan. 1, 2010). The title appears in the TBOC for the first time, but the phrase
“except that” was omitted from the new codification. See Tex. H.B. 1156, 78th Leg.,
R.S. (2003). The Bill Analysis for the TBOC uses not “excepts” but “excludes,” which
is consistent with a purpose to clarify. See House Comm. on Bus. & Indus., Bill Anal-
ysis, Tex. H.B. 1156, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). The Revisor’s Report states, “[n]o sub-
stantive change is intended.” Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 7, 1997
Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1522–23 (expired Jan. 1, 2010) § 21.224, 119–20 revisor’s note
(1997), https://tlc.texas.gov/legal/bocode/78r4361-part3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGH8-
4A2X]. This suggests that “except” always meant only to clarify the meaning of the
limitation now contained in Section 21.223(a).
74. Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516,
1522–23 (expired Jan. 1, 2010) § 21.224, 119–20 revisor’s note (1997), https://
tlc.texas.gov/legal/bocode/78r4361-part3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGH8-4A2X].
75. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 599–600 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
76. Id. at 600.
77. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (West 2019).
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trating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily
for the direct personal benefit of the holder . . . or affiliate.78
This language did not apply, the court said, but it made no ruling be-
cause Dresser-Rand neither pleaded nor proved that Treurniet “acted
primarily for her direct personal benefit.”79 The court elaborated on
the language a few months later in Hong v. Havey.80
B. Hong v. Havey
Mandy Hong and three relatives were shareholders of Shadow
Creek Bay, Inc. (“Shadow”); Hong was the primary manager.81
Shadow bought a 6.24-acre tract of land with two bank loans that the
shareholders personally guaranteed.82 But Shadow fell into financial
trouble and became delinquent. “These difficulties prompted efforts
to sell the 6.24-acre tract.”83 Shadow owed about $1,728,000.84 One
shareholder testified that the shareholders tried to sell the tract in or-
der to avoid guarantee liability,85 and this concern was reflected in
Hong’s communication with realtors.86
Shadow worked with a realtor, Fuentes, to sell the property.87
While continuing to encourage Fuentes to sell the tract, Hong met
with Havey and on Shadow’s behalf executed a contract entitled
“Commercial Real Estate Listing Agreement, Exclusive Right to
Sell.”88 In this contract, Shadow through Hong promised to list the
tract exclusively with Havey’s company, United Texas Realtors
(“United”).89 The agreement obligated Shadow to pay a 4% commis-
sion if the tract sold “to anyone at any price on any terms” during the
period of the agreement.90 The listing agreement with United contem-
plated marketing the tract for about $1.7 million—what Shadow owed
the bank.91
United’s owner, Havey, arranged a sale of the property for $1.4 mil-
lion, and Shadow signed a sales contract for that.92 Despite this con-
tract and the listing agreement, Shadow failed to appear at the
78. Id. § 21.223(b).
79. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 603.
80. Hong v. Havey, 551 S.W.3d 875, 883–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, no pet.).
81. Id. at 878.
82. Id. The facts do not tell us the form of the guarantee.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 885.
86. Id. at 880.
87. Id. at 878–79.




92. Id. Mandy and Mau Hong both “instructed Havey to go through with the
sale.” Id. Shadow, by its president Mau Hong, actually signed the contract. Id. The
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scheduled closing and continued to work with Fuentes.93 Shadow later
sold the property to another party through Fuentes for $1.525 mil-
lion.94 Shadow paid a commission to Fuentes and refused to pay
United a commission.95 The sale left Shadow with $200,000 owing to
the bank; after negotiations, the bank released its lien “in exchange
for a $100,000 note” from Shadow, guaranteed by Hong’s spouse.96
The sale through Fuentes thus left the Shadow shareholders with
$125,000 less in contingent liability than they would have had with the
sale through Havey. Follow-on negotiation with the bank decreased
that liability by, in Hong’s case, an additional $200,000.
United and Havey sued Shadow and Mandy Hong.97 The jury found
against Shadow for breach of contract, against Hong as Shadow’s alter
ego, and against Shadow and Hong individually for common law fraud
and conspiracy.98 The fraud, the jury said, was that Ms. Hong had
promised without any intention to perform.99 Ms. Hong appealed.100
1. Subsection (a)(2)
Hong’s deception was fraud in the inducement. The court analyzed
Hong’s personal liability for fraud in a similar manner to that of
TecLogistics, relying on that opinion’s analysis. As in TecLogistics, the
court attempted to match the facts to the statute. The court in effect
held that fraud in the inducement of a contract “relates to” that con-
tractual obligation,101 hardly an issue given the malleability of “related
to.” And again the court glossed over the “on the basis of [all the veil-
piercing theories of liability] or other similar theory” language. The
court held that the statute applied to Hong, with a cite to TecLogistics
sale was postponed when the Hongs did not appear at the scheduled closing. Id. at
880.




97. Id. at 877.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 881.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 889–90. The court claimed that “the basis for [Havey’s] common law
fraud claim” is the promise in the listing agreement that Havey’s company would
receive the commission; the court also claimed that “Havey sought as damages his
commission,” though as a factual matter the damages for fraud in the inducement and
contract breach are identical here. Id. at 889. The court’s insistence that these are
merely contract seems rigidly formalistic, especially when there is little doubt that
liability for fraud in the inducement “relates to” the contractual obligation. The court
continues to imply that the fraud claim sought contract damages when analyzing
whether Havey and his company are obligees of Shadow Creek, though they would be
contractual obligees no matter what damages Havey sought. Id. at 890.
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in support.102 (The 14th has not yet cited in support the conforming
precedent from the Texarkana Court of Appeals.103)
2. Subsection (b)
The 14th doubled down against suing business owners for fraud in
another part of the opinion. When the statute applies, by its terms, the
protected corporate actors are not liable unless they engaged in actual
fraud “primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder . . . or
affiliate.” The court held that Hong’s case did not satisfy this stan-
dard.104 The court’s reasoning is hard to follow. While the court ig-
nored the language of subsection (a)(2), the court gave each of the
words in subsection (b) a hypertechnical meaning.
The evidence showed that Hong promised to cause Shadow to use
Havey’s firm exclusively even while she intended to cause Shadow to
use Fuentes, also. That fraudulent promise was the basis of the jury’s
102. Id. at 890. The court also cited a second 14th court precedent from 2013, Lone
Star Air Systems, Ltd. v. Powers, 401 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, no pet.). The 14th court appears to have discovered Powers after deciding
TecLogistics, as Powers appears in support here for the first time. See TecLogistics,
527 S.W.3d 589 (lacking any reference to the Powers case). But the plaintiff in Powers
brought no individual, non-veil-piercing fraud claim. See Powers, 401 S.W.3d at
862–63. Here is the quoted language: “Moreover, in light of section 21.224, the only
theory of fraud available to Lone Star against Powers individually is one that requires
proof that Power [sic] perpetrated the fraud for his direct, personal benefit.” Id. at
863. The sentence is clear enough: all individual fraud claims against Powers must go
through the statute. But because the court already ruled that Lone Star made no tort
claims of fraud against Powers individually, this statement was dicta.
Lone Star sued Powers for “breach of contract, fraud, and alter ego.” Id. at 857.
Powers filed for summary judgment on the breach claim and “a hybrid no-evidence
and traditional summary judgment motion on Lone Star’s ‘veil piercing claims,’ in-
cluding fraud and alter ego.” Id. The trial court granted both motions, and Lone Star
appealed. Id. at 857–58. In response to Powers’s claim that TBOC Sections 21.223
through 21.224 were not satisfied, Lone Star argued that it sued Powers individually,
not derivatively. Id. at 863. The court’s response? No, you did not; you sued only
derivatively:
Lone Star argue[d] that it did not seek to pierce the corporate veil in pur-
suing a claim against Powers individually for common law fraud and thus
was not required . . . [to comply with the statute]. However, by its minimal
fraud pleading, Lone Star does seek to hold Powers individually liable for
the alleged $196,701 obligation under a contract to which he is not a
party. . . .
Lone Star argues that it does not seek to pierce the corporate veil, to hold
Powers liable but rather is suing Powers in his individual capacity for fraudu-
lent acts. Again, this contention is not supported by Lone Star’s pleading,
summary judgment response, or evidence.
Id. at 862–63. Without question, the court concluded that Lone Star made no individ-
ual claim. Because Lone Star made no individual tort claim, the court could not rule
on one.
103. Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000,
no pet.).
104. Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 886.
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fraud finding.105 The scheme was obviously meant to allow Hong to
see which realtor obtained the higher price for the tract. The share-
holders testified that their goal in selling the property was to minimize
their guarantee liability on the bank loans.106 Yet the court held that
the fraud was not “primarily for the direct personal benefit” of Hong.
The court gave essentially three arguments: (1) Hong received no
cash from the transaction. Cases satisfying this “primarily for the di-
rect personal benefit” standard, the court explains, included “evidence
. . . that funds derived from the corporation’s allegedly fraudulent con-
duct were pocketed by or diverted to the individual defendant.”107 Ev-
idence that the proceeds of fraud “were used to satisfy a corporation’s
financial obligations” was insufficient.108 Here, “[t]he evidence does
not show that the unpaid real estate commission owed to [Havey’s
company] was pocketed by or diverted to Mandy. . . . [T]he evidence
does not show a direct personal benefit to [Hong] from the alleged
fraud.”109 The court therefore held that removal of her guarantee lia-
bility did not count—no pocketing or diverting occurred there.110
(2) In another part, the court hung this result on the word primarily:
The fraud was not “perpetrated primarily to benefit Mandy.”111 “Ha-
vey sought to recover the four percent commission due under the . . .
agreement . . . . This commission was not directed to Mandy.”112
(3) Perhaps sensing that these arguments were not very persuasive,
the court added another: The connection between the fraud and the
reduction of guarantee liability was too attenuated.113 In its argument,
the court first morphed Hong’s fraudulent promise from a promise of
exclusivity into a “promise, made without an intent to fulfill it, to pay
Havey’s commission upon the tract’s sale to any buyer for any amount
during the exclusivity period.”114 While these two descriptions facially
cover the same facts, the second allows the court to imply that the
fraud was only about the failure to pay the commission. The descrip-
tion is plausible only in hindsight; certainly Hong would have paid
Havey’s company the commission if Havey had produced the higher
offer. Hong actually promised to use Havey’s company exclusively
and immediately breached that promise. But having imposed an alter-
native, plausible-in-post-hoc-only description on the fraudulent prom-
ise, the court then acted as if Hong merely promised falsely to pay a
commission. A false promise of exclusivity is more closely tied to the
105. Id. at 881. This is the way Havey’s brief made its case.
106. Id. at 885.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 886.
109. Id. at 887.
110. Id. at 887–88.
111. Id. at 887.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 886.
114. Id.
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shareholders’ professed desire to avoid paying on the guaranty; that
was the point of gaming the realtors. But a false promise to pay a
commission seems less related to the guarantee, because it would have
been owed to one of the realtors in any event:
The extent of Mandy’s personal liability on the guaranty is not af-
fected by whether Shadow Creek did or did not pay Havey’s prom-
ised commission because that commission was owed for any sale
occurring during the exclusivity period—regardless of who bought
the tract and how much was paid.115
This mischaracterization of the fraudulent promise is implausible, and
the court’s conclusion is also incorrect. Hong’s failure to have Shadow
pay Havey’s commission—and, as per the court’s reconstructed ver-
sion of the promise, it fraudulently failed to do—certainly did “affect
the scope of [Hong’s] personal liability on the guarantee.”116 Had
Shadow paid the commission owed to Havey’s company, Shadow
would have paid the bank that much less. The failure to pay the com-
mission thus rendered the guarantee liability less by the amount of the
commission, if nothing else.
Both the pocketed or diverted standard and the great lengths the
court went to manufacture a rationalization for rejecting Hong’s fraud
liability strongly suggest that business owners who commit fraud and
leave the proceeds in the corporation will not be liable for their own
torts, even when the influx of entity cash for their own personal eco-
nomic benefit was the very goal of their fraudulent behavior.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. The Court’s Misreading
1. The Law of Statutes
The State of Texas sends new legislative directives out every two
years from Austin, but these statutes are not written in a vacuum and
not intended to be interpreted according to judges’ political prefer-
ences. The Legislature itself has instructed the courts to take care. The
“primary goal in statutory construction is to give effect to the Legisla-
ture’s intent.”117 Courts “rely on the plain meaning of the text as ex-
pressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by
legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain
meaning leads to absurd results.”118
Most of Texas’s statutes about statutory interpretation and con-
struction are common-sense rules: “Words and phrases shall be read
in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and com-
115. Id.; see also id. at 887–88 (showing the court’s doubling-down on this rationale,
where it essentially repeated this argument).
116. Id. at 888.
117. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 672 (Tex. 2018).
118. Id.
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mon usage.”119 “Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise,
shall be construed accordingly.”120
Others aim to protect the legislative results from misconstruction:
“[I]t is presumed that . . .  (2) the entire statute is intended to be effec-
tive; (3) a just and reasonable result is intended; . . . and (5) public
interest is favored over any private interest.”121 Also,
In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered am-
biguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the:
(1) object sought to be attained;
(2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3) legislative history;
(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on
the same or similar subjects;
(5) consequences of a particular construction;
(6) administrative construction of the statute; and
(7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.122
The courts have added their own jurisprudence: “Where language
in a statute is unambiguous, this court must seek the intent of the leg-
islature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and
terms used.”123 “But enforcing a statute’s plain language does not
mean employing a bloodless literalism in which text is viewed as if it
had no context.”124
2. The Misconstruction
In TecLogistics, the court misread the statute. Here is the language
again:
(a) A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares,
. . . or any affiliate of such a holder, owner, or subscriber or of the
corporation, may not be held liable to the corporation or its obli-
gees with respect to: . . .
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the
holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate is or was the alter ego of
the corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a
sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory . . . .125
As noted above in Part III.A, the court read two clauses in Section
21.223(a)(2) as if they were not part of the statute. While it may be
true that the business owner in TecLogistics was sued “on the basis of
119. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West 1985).
120. Id. § 311.011(b).
121. Id. § 311.021.
122. Id. § 311.023.
123. Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1990).
124. Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 74 (Tex. 2019).
125. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223 (West 2019).
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actual fraud,” the business owner was not sued “on the basis of actual
or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar
theory.”126 These are each theories of veil-piercing liability named as
such in Castleberry and other Texas cases;127 they are the background
against which the statute was written. The 14th reads the statute as if
“actual . . . fraud” is not part of the rest of the statute that says what
kind of theory of actual fraud is at issue. The court should read the
statute as a whole, not select out phrases.
Moreover, “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise,
shall be construed accordingly.”128 The courts in Castleberry and other
cases gave a technical meaning to “actual fraud”—a theory of deriva-
tive liability similar in effect to (or part and parcel with—it was some-
times hard to tell129) “constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud,
or other similar theory” and similar in effect also to the non-fraud
wing of Texas veil-piercing jurisprudence, “alter ego.” The phrase “ac-
tual fraud” appears in the statute because of its use in Castleberry and
related cases to refer to a theory of veil-piercing liability.130 The
phrase in the statute does not mean the tort of fraud.
In fact, “actual . . . fraud” in subsection (a)(2) logically cannot mean
the tort of fraud. A person who commits the tort of fraud is liable
directly, and no veil piercing has ever been necessary to reach them.
Subsection (b), moreover, which adds elements other than those of
the tort of actual fraud, would be (and would have been) redundant,
because a person committing the tort of fraud would always have been
directly liable for fraud regardless of subsection (b)’s allowance of
veil-piercing liability (and the damages would probably be identical to
veil piercing, given subsection (b)’s elements).131
To abandon the veil-piercing meaning of “actual . . . fraud” in sub-
section (a)(2) is to abandon the technical meaning of the phrase and
forget its context in a list of theories of veil-piercing liability. It is to
change the meaning of “actual . . . fraud” in subsection (a)(2) from a
theory of derivative liability to a theory of direct liability. Failure to
accord the phrase “actual fraud” the technical meaning it has as a the-
ory of veil-piercing liability would result in the oddity that this single
phrase in this one subsection has one meaning when applied to a suit
126. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (West 2012); see TecLogistics, Inc.
v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, no pet.). That TecLogistics’s holding is inconsistent with the statute’s require-
ment of an “other similar theory” helped persuade the court in Bates Energy Oil &
Gas v. Complete Oilfield Servs., 361 F. Supp. 3d 633, 673 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
127. See supra note 54. R
128. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(b) (West 1985).
129. See supra note 54. R
130. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. R
131. Regarding the meaning of “actual fraud” as a veil-piercing theory in Section
21.223, see Ricks, supra note 10, at 75–77.
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by a creditor seeking to pierce the corporate veil—actual fraud the
derivative theory of liability—and another meaning when applied to a
creditor seeking a judgment that the person who committed fraud is
liable for her own tort—the tort of actual fraud. Other phrases in the
list clearly mean only the derivative theory: “alter ego” and “sham to
perpetrate a fraud” clearly refer only to a veil-piercing theory of liabil-
ity. Those phrases also carry the technical meanings of those terms as
established by Castleberry and other cases.132 No reason exists to
think that the legislature meant to sneak secondary meanings in for
actual fraud and (presumably) for constructive fraud. Nothing in the
lists suggests those terms are any different in kind than alter ego and
sham to perpetrate. The key word similar in the catch-all clause at the
end, “or other similar theory,” would hardly make sense if the items in
the list were not similar in this key respect.
Finally, the 14th’s decisions ignore the context of Section 21.223 it-
self when those decisions presume that legislation in the corporate
code means to exempt certain actors within corporations from tort
liability for those individuals’ own torts. In this respect also, the court
misreads “on the basis of.” The basis of liability of a judgment against
a person who commits actual fraud the tort is not the imposition of the
corporate liability on the shareholder, owner, or affiliate. It is not a
derivative liability, nor is it agency law or a special facet of any law of
business entities. The basis of liability of a judgment against a person
who commits actual fraud is the legal, moral, and personal responsibil-
ity not to hurt others intentionally—a legal duty imposed on all citi-
zens equally by the common law of tort.133 To read a statute ostensibly
addressed only to veil-piercing claims against corporate actors to ex-
empt them from the personal responsibility that every other citizen of
the state has—a duty not to seek property and profit by deceiving
others—is to read a statute of the corporate code far outside of its
corporate context.134
132. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271–73 (Tex. 1986); Rose v.
Intercontinental Bank, N.A., 705 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (describing veil-piercing law as requiring that “the corporation
must be used by the individual as an unfair device to achieve an inequitable result or
as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or to avoid a personal liability”); Tigrett v. Pointer,
580 S.W.2d 375, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref’d, n.r.e.) (describing alter ego,
fraud, and constructive fraud); see also, e.g., supra notes 54–58 and accompanying R
text.
133. See Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018) (“Texas law has long
imposed a duty to abstain from inducing another to enter into a contract through the
use of fraudulent misrepresentations. Fraudulent inducement is a species of common-
law fraud . . . .”); Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2001).
134. The 14th’s reading would be more plausible for a statute such as TBOC Sec-
tion 152.801(a): “Except as provided by the partnership agreement, a partner is not
personally liable to any person, including a partner, directly or indirectly, by contribu-
tion, indemnity, or otherwise, for any obligation of the partnership incurred while the
partnership is a limited liability partnership.” If the partner’s own tortious conduct
created the partnership’s obligation, does the statute create an exemption from per-
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To this last argument, the TecLogistics court seems to have re-
sponded in the following way:
But, a corporation is a separate legal entity from its shareholders,
officers, and directors, and as a general rule, ‘‘the actions of a corpo-
rate agent on behalf of the corporation are deemed the corpora-
tion’s acts.’’ Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1995).
For Treurniet to be individually liable for these acts, more is
required.135
The court reads into the Holloway quote that the acts of the agent are
not also her own acts (something the Holloway court wanted to say).
But the Holloway statement’s appearance in TecLogistics is both mis-
placed and incorrect. The statement is misplaced because, if the state-
ment were true in the context of TecLogistics, then TecLogistics
would not have had to address the veil-piercing statute at all; the rule
from Holloway would have rendered Treurniet immune already, with-
out the veil-piercing statute. The court’s entire analysis of the statute
assumes that the rule from Holloway has no such effect in TecLogis-
tics. The statute can only render an actor immune from liability if she
was subject to liability in the first place. Thus, not even the 14th
thought the Holloway language to have the effect the court suggests in
this passage.
The statement is incorrect, too. The court calls it “a general rule,”
and it is not.136 The Supreme Court of Texas said what the 14th
quoted, but the court later clarified that “a corporate agent is person-
sonal liability for that conduct? One key difference between this provision and Sec-
tion 21.223 is that this provision has no “on the basis of” clause, and names no veil-
piercing theory. Id. §§ 21.223, 152.801. Would the 14th have a better argument that
this statute has that effect? No. Not even this statute has such an effect: “Subsection
(a) does not affect . . . the liability of a partner, if any, imposed by law or contract
independently of the partner’s status as a partner.” Id. § 152.801(d)(2). Neither does
Section 21.223 have such an effect.
135. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
136. This same error is made in a CLE presentation. David Chamberlain & Eva
DeLeon, Running the End Around: Corporate and LLC Officers’ and Owners’ Per-
sonal Liability for their Company’s Conduct 1 (Sept. 26–27, 2018) (treating the state-
ment from Holloway as a general rule). Chamberlain and DeLeon talk as if forming a
corporation is “a shield from personal liability,” as if it exempted certain persons from
personal liability for torts the person committed. Id. at 1 (“an important purpose of
creating a corporation . . . is to shield the owner from personal liability”). The authors
never once distinguish between torts for which a business owner or controller is liable
derivatively as controller and torts the person herself commits, yet the corporate
“shield” applies only to the former because the entity becomes the principal in place
of the individual. See id. The so-called “shield” is only the effect of the corporation’s
status as an entity separate from its shareholders and managers. The tortfeasor has
always been personally liable for the torts she commits, pursuant to independent du-
ties imposed on all Texans by tort law.
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ally liable for his own fraudulent or tortious acts.”137 The court ex-
plained the distinction with an example from a negligence case:
[I]ndividual liability arises only when the officer or agent owes an
independent duty . . . to the injured party apart from the employer’s
duty . . . . For example, an agent whose negligence causes an auto
accident may be held individually liable along with his or her em-
ployer when driving in the course and scope of employment. . . .
Because the agent owes a duty of reasonable care to the general
public regardless of whether the auto accident occurs while driving
for the employer, individual liability may attach.138
And in the context of fraud in the inducement, at issue in Hong, the
principle is the same: “[T]he legal duty not to fraudulently procure a
contract is separate and independent from the duties established by
the contract itself.”139 Thus, courts hold generally along this line:
“[A] corporate agent is personally liable for his own fraudulent . . .
acts.”140 The 14th itself so holds (or held).141
137. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. 2002) (holding corporate officers
could be liable under the DTPA for misrepresentations); Leyendecker & Assocs. v.
Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1984) (“A corporation’s employee is personally
liable for tortious acts which he directs or participates in during his employment.”);
see also Alexander v. Kent, 480 S.W.3d 676, 697–98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no
pet.) (“The general rule in Texas has always been that a corporation’s employee is
personally liable for tortious acts which he directs or participates in during his em-
ployment.” (internal quotations omitted)); Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d
347, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“If a corporate agent directs
or participates in a tort during his employment, he faces personal liability for the
tortious act.”); see also Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137–38 (1882)
(holding that neither the limitations of privity of contract nor the agency status of an
attorney shielded the attorney from liability for his own fraud); Likover v. Sunflower
Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)
(holding similarly to Pool for an attorney).
138. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996) (citations omitted).
139. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 46–47 (Tex. 1998) (“[A]n independent legal duty, separate from the existence of
the contract itself, precludes the use of fraud to induce a binding agreement.”) (hold-
ing that the economic loss rule does not preclude a fraudulent inducement claim).
140. Miller, 90 S.W.3d at 717; see also Chico Auto Parts & Serv., Inc. v. Crockett,
512 S.W.3d 560, 575 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (“We agree . . . that a
plaintiff may sue a corporation’s affiliate for his torts, including fraud, without the
need to pierce the corporate veil.” (citing Miller)); Key v. Richards, No. 03-14-00116-
CV, 2016 WL 240773, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing Miller & Leyendecker & Assocs.); Alexander v. Kent, 480 S.W.3d 676, 697–98
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (citing Miller, and also holding that the suit for
individual fraud could proceed against the corporate officer); Shafipour v. Rischon
Dev. Corp., No. 11-13-00212-CV, 2015 WL 3454219, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland May
29, 2015, pet. denied) (“In an action seeking to hold an officer liable for his fraudulent
statements, the corporate veil is not required to be pierced.”) (citing Miller, and also
holding that a suit for individual fraud could proceed against a corporate president);
Maes v. Quintanilla, No. 13-13-00005-CV, 2015 WL 1957548, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 30, 2015, pet. denied) (citing Miller, and also holding
that a suit for individual fraud could proceed against a corporate officer and share-
holder); Majestic Cast, Inc. v. Khalaf, No. 05-12-00112-CV, 2013 WL 4568203, at *4
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2013, no pet.) (citing Miller, and also holding that a suit
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Holloway is not inconsistent with the general rule for tortious con-
duct; Holloway’s statement is a limited exception to it. Holloway’s
language applies (to hold that the corporation alone is liable) only
when the agent has no independent duty. When the entity alone has a
duty and the person serving as its agent has no independent duty, then
that person’s actions while serving as agent are merely the entity’s.
“[A] party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with its own con-
tract.”142 In Holloway, the entity’s duty was merely contractual, and
the directors and officers were not parties to the contract. The alleged
tort was inducing a corporation to violate a contractual obligation. In
such a case, the court held that the agent’s liability turned on whether
the agent “acted in a fashion so contrary to the corporation’s best in-
terests that his action could only have been motivated by personal
interests.”143 (If the corporate actor was merely acting as a corporate
actor, with purely corporate motives,144 with regard to a contract that
imposed duties only on the corporation, then only the corporation’s
duty was at issue.) Liability thus turned on whether the agent owed an
independent duty. Holloway was not new law, and its descendants and
predecessors have resided quite comfortably for a couple of genera-
tions with the general rule that an agent is independently liable for her
own tortious conduct.145 The same explanation applies equally to
Leitch v. Hornsby,146 also sometimes cited alongside Holloway.
for individual fraud could proceed against a corporate actor who claimed he could
only be held liable via veil-piercing); Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (citing Miller, and also holding that the suit for
individual fraud could proceed against an LLC member); Gore v. Scotland Golf, Inc.,
136 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (citing Miller, and also
holding that a suit for individual fraud could proceed against a corporate officer and
majority shareholder).
141. JJJJ Walker, LLC v. Yollick, 447 S.W.3d 453, 470 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (citing Miller).
142. Comty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 690 (Tex.
2017) (discussing Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. 1995) at length).
143. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796.
144. See id. at 796–98 (remanding under the court’s test because Holloway owned
only 40% of the corporation’s stock and therefore his interests and the corporation’s
were “not of necessity identical”).
145. See Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 690; Latch v. Gratty, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex.
2003); Maxey v. Citizen’s Nat’l Bank of Lubbock, 507 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Tex. 1974) (“It
has been held that an officer or director may not be held liable in damages for induc-
ing the corporation to violate a contractual obligation, provided that the officer or
director acts in good faith and believes that what he does is for the best interest of the
corporation.”); Sw. States Oil & Gas Co. v. Sovereign Res., Inc., 365 S.W.2d 417, 422
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
146. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117–18 (Tex. 1996). Leitch dealt only with
a duty of workplace safety, and the agents sued owed no independent duty:
Leitch and Crews had no individual duty as corporate officers to provide
Hornsby with a safe workplace. The duty to provide a safe workplace was a
nondelegable duty imposed on, and belonging solely to, Pro Com. The re-
cord does not show a breach of any other duty by Leitch and Crews. Because
a corporate officer acting on the corporation’s behalf does not owe a corpo-
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As noted above, Section 21.224 can do nothing to save the 14th’s
analysis.147 That section’s effect is limited only to the veil-piercing lia-
bility addressed by Section 21.223. Nor can Section 21.225 assist.148
TecLogistics and Hong really give no justification from the statute
itself or from precedent for the 14th’s misconstruction of the statute’s
language.
3. The New Anomaly That Is Subsection (b)
The 14th’s reading not only ignores “on the basis” and “other simi-
lar theory” and transforms “actual fraud” the veil-piercing theory into
a general tort theory, further ignoring the statute’s requirement of “on
the basis of”—the court’s reading also results in subsection (a) cover-
ing far more kinds of fraud than are addressed in subsection (b). This
creates the strange result that the statute now protects corporate ac-
tors more comprehensively against liability for fraud they themselves
commit than it protects the same corporate actors against corporate
liability. One would think it would be the other way around.
The most prominent caveat to the limitation of Section 21.223(a)(2)
is the explicit exclusion of subsection (b). Subsection (b) reads as
follows:
(b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a
holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates
that the holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate caused the corpora-
tion to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate
an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal ben-
efit of the holder, beneficial owner, . . . or affiliate.149
Subsection (b) is—merely—a carefully crafted retention of a basis for
veil-piercing liability (quite appropriate following a limitation on veil-
piercing liability, which is what (a)(2) actually describes). The subsec-
tion (b) theory applies only when the shareholder or affiliate “caused
the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating” an actual
fraud on an obligee. This is language of veil-piercing; veil-piercing the-
ories are those that require that the corporate form has been
rate employee an individual duty to provide that employee with a safe work
place, and because Leitch and Crews did not breach any separate duty, the
court of appeals erred in affirming their individual liability.
Id. at 118 (citations omitted). See also Watkins v. Basurto, No. 14-10-00299-CV, 2011
WL 1414135, at *9 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (listing cases back and forth on whether a corporate officer owes an inde-
pendent duty regarding the negligent hiring and supervision of entity employees).
147. See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
149. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2019).
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abused—that “the corporate form has been used as part of a basically
unfair device to achieve an inequitable result.”150
In contrast, the open-ended, non-derivative, tort-of-fraud-based
theories of liability that the 14th claims are included in subsection
(a)(2)—the ones that are not similar to alter ego and sham to perpe-
trate a fraud—do not (as the 14th construes them) seem to require
that the corporation play any role in the fraud. An affiliate—director,
officer, or perhaps employee—apparently may commit any kind of
common law fraud, but as long as the affiliate does not “cause[ ] the
corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating” it (something
a mere employee usually has no power to do in any event), then sub-
section (b) does not apply. No amount of harm done to the obligee
will matter.
The 14th’s theory thus creates an odd set of cross-purposes. Without
the 14th’s theory, the statute as a whole fulfills its commonly under-
stood purpose to tighten up the standards for veil-piercing liability,
and (a)(2) and (b) work together with regard to contract and contract-
related veil-piercing liability to make sure that veil-piercing liability
only occurs when conditions set forth in (b) are satisfied. But under
the 14th’s theory, subsection (a)(2) now has a second goal: to exempt
corporate actors from liability for the fraud-based torts they person-
ally commit. And as to this, subsection (b) says nothing; it will apply
only in the fluke of a case in which veil-piercing liability would also
apply to the conduct for which the person is personally exempt. The
logically odd result is that a corporate actor is now more likely—when
subsection (b) applies—to be found liable derivatively for a tort she
did not commit than she is to be found liable for the torts she person-
ally committed—to which subsection (b) does not really apply.
This odd result suggests that the 14th has misread the statute. The
presence of a limited allowance of veil-piercing liability and the ab-
sence of any similar limitation on the far broader and more sweeping
150. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex.
2008) (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986)). Consider
further:
We have never held corporations liable for each other’s obligations merely
because of centralized control, mutual purposes, and shared finances. There
must also be evidence of abuse, or as we said in Castleberry, injustice and
inequity. By “injustice” and “inequity” we do not mean a subjective percep-
tion of unfairness by an individual judge or juror; rather, these words are
used in Castleberry as shorthand references for the kinds of abuse, specifi-
cally identified, that the corporate structure should not shield—fraud, eva-
sion of existing obligations, circumvention of statutes, monopolization,
criminal conduct, and the like. Such abuse is necessary before disregarding
the existence of a corporation as a separate entity. Any other rule would
seriously compromise what we have called a “bedrock principle of corporate
law”—that a legitimate purpose for forming a corporation is to limit individ-
ual liability for the corporation’s obligations.
Id. at 455.
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exemption from personal liability for personally committed fraud
strongly suggests this misreading. The statute chokes on the gnat of
veil-piercing liability while swallowing whole the camel of an exemp-
tion from the more basic and foundational tort of actual fraud.
4. Legislative Intent
Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of the argument from “plain lan-
guage” that lawyers in Houston and the 14th itself failed to notice for
twenty years, the TecLogistics court attempted to explain how a stat-
ute designed to address derivative liability somehow now creates an
exemption from tort law. Its recitation of legislative history151 is aimed
at this explanation, but nothing in the legislative history supports the
court’s result.
The general history of the statute is familiar to Texas corporate
practitioners. The amendments that make up the statute’s present
form began in 1989. At first, the 14th said,
the statute protected only shareholders . . .  and owners of a benefi-
cial interest in shares; shielded them only from the corporation’s
contractual obligations; and applied only if the claimant sought to
hold an individual liable based on actual fraud, constructive fraud,
sham to perpetrate a fraud, or failure to observe corporate formali-
ties and statutory requirements.152
The statute was changed slightly in 1993 to expressly “preempt[ ] . . .
the common law” and also to add “alter ego” and the language “other
similar theory.”153 Those changes occurred in 1993, and no one claims
the 1993 changes expanded the statute’s scope in the way the 14th
says.
The 14th claims the 1997 amendments changed the statute funda-
mentally. So what happened? Here is the court’s explanation:
It was not until 1997 that the statute reached its current breadth. At
that time, the legislature expanded the scope of the statute’s protec-
tion so that covered persons were protected from liability not only
for the corporation’s contractual obligations but also for “any mat-
ter relating to or arising from the obligation.” The legislature also
151. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 599–600 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The court’s argument is similar to that of
Glenn West, an early advocate of the TecLogistics result. See Glenn D. West & Adam
D. Nelson, Corporations, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 799, 804–09 (2004); West & Chao, supra
note 57, at 1403–08; Glenn D. West & Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations, 55 S.M.U.
L. REV. 803, 811–16 (2002). Incidentally, West calls the personal tort liability of cor-
porate officials for acts done within their capacity as corporate agents a principle of
agency law, see, e.g., West & Treadway supra note 151, at 805, but agency law never
created tort liability. Only tort law can do that. Agency supports this result on
grounds that tort law should be left to do its work. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.01 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
152. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 599.
153. Act of Feb. 26, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 215, § 2.05, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 418,
446 (expired Jan. 1, 2010) (current version at TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223).
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enlarged the classes of persons who were protected by the statute to
include not only shareholders, subscribers, and owners of beneficial
interests in shares, but also “any affiliate thereof or of the corpora-
tion.” An “affiliate” was defined as “a person who directly or indi-
rectly through one or more intermediaries controls, is controlled by,
or is under common control with a specified person.” With this
change, the statute began to shield those with the right to control
the corporation, even if they had no actual or beneficial ownership
interest.154
But shield them from what? Looking at the statute before and after
it was amended in 1997 makes the purpose and effect of the 1997
amendments quite clear, and none of them, either alone or collec-
tively, has the effect the court claims.
Here is the statute pre-1997, after the 1993 amendments. Note that
the statute addresses only veil-piercing liability for corporate “con-
tractual obligation.” The statute offers no protection at all for share-
holders or other corporate controllers with regard to veil piercing for
corporate torts.
A. A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in
shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been ac-
cepted shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obli-
gees with respect to:
(1) such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation
the full amount of the consideration, fixed in compliance with Ar-
ticle 2.15 of this Act, for which such shares were or are to be
issued;
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis that
the holder, owner, or subscriber is or was the alter ego of the
corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud,
a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the
obligee demonstrates that the holder, owner, or subscriber caused
the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and
did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the
direct personal benefit of the holder, owner, or subscriber; or
(3) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of
the failure of the corporation to observe any corporate formality,
including without limitation: (a) the failure to comply with any
requirement of this Act or of the articles of incorporation or by-
laws of the corporation; or (b) the failure to observe any require-
ment prescribed by this Act or by the articles of incorporation or
bylaws for acts to be taken by the corporation, its board of direc-
tors, or its shareholders.
B. The liability of a holder, owner, or subscriber of shares of a cor-
poration for an obligation that is limited by Section A of this article
is exclusive and preempts any other liability imposed on a holder,
owner, or subscriber of shares of a corporation for that obligation
154. TecLogistics, 527 S.W.3d at 599–600 (citations to the statute and legislative
enactments omitted).
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under common law or otherwise, except that nothing contained in
this article shall limit the obligation of a holder, owner, or sub-
scriber to an obligee of the corporation when:
(1) the holder, owner, or subscriber has expressly assumed, guar-
anteed, or agreed to be personally liable to the obligee for the
obligation; or
(2) the holder, owner, or subscriber is otherwise liable to the obligee
for the obligation under this Act or another applicable statute.155
Beginning with this language, the 1997 amendments changed two
things:
First, the 1997 amendments did indeed add “affiliates” to the list of
protected persons. The 1997 amendment adding “affiliate” did not de-
fine “affiliate” for the predecessor of Sections 21.223–.225, but an-
other part of the same bill did define “affiliate,” adopting a definition
all but identical to the one found in the statute today.156 No reason
exists to suppose that the courts would not have drawn on a definition
enacted in the same bill.157 The TBOC later set forth a general defini-
tion that drew directly from the language of the 1997 amendment,158 a
definition taken from the federal securities laws.159 That is the defini-
tion in the code today: “a person who controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with another person.”160
But these amendments do not change any substantive protection of
the statute—protections against veil-piercing liability; they merely add
another set of persons to those who are protected. Adding a control-
ling person to the list of persons protected by the statute is logical and
consistent with the statute’s purpose of limiting veil-piercing liability.
155. Supra note 153.
156. Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 47, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516,
1556 (expired Jan. 1, 2010). The definition adopted for Art. 13.02 of the Texas Busi-
ness Corporations Act stated that affiliate “means a person who directly or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with a specified person.” The TBOC now states that affiliate “means a person
who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another person.”
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002(1).
157. The 1997 amendments also added the word affiliate to several of the common
definitions in the Business Corporation Act without adding affiliate itself to the list of
definitions. See Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 1, art. 1.02.A(2), (12),
(15), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1516 (expired Jan. 1, 2010). Probably the 1997
amendments intended a court to draw the meaning of affiliate from the same bill in
which the word was added to the code.
158. Tex. H.B. 1156, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (stating straightforwardly the definition
and its source: “‘Affiliate’ means a person who controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with another person.”).
159. House Comm. on Bus. & Indus., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1156, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) (“The Code adopts the definition of ‘affiliate’ from the Federal Securities Act
of 1933, as amended.”). See the definition in the Securities Act of 1933, § 16(f)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77p(f)(1), “The term ‘affiliate of the Issuer’ means a person that directly or
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by or is under
common control with, the issuer.”
160. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002(1).
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A person can be subject to veil-piercing liability even though she is
not a shareholder, director, or officer, so long as that person controls
the corporation.161 Otherwise, a controlling person could avoid veil-
piercing liability merely by selling shares to or appointing others to
positions or simply not selling shares to anyone or appointing anyone
to any positions at all.162 The addition of affiliates to the protections of
the statute also closes an obvious loophole for a parent corporation
and the non-shareholding officer, both controlling persons.163 The
“controlled” person was also made an affiliate. The addition of this
language also closes an obvious loophole for a subsidiary.164 Adding
“affiliate” to the class of protected persons did not change the protec-
tions themselves.
Second, the 1997 amendments added the language “or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation,” referring to the contractual
obligation.165 But that language also does not change the kind of pro-
tection the statute offers. The impetus for this change is obvious and
unrelated to any exemption from tort law. Before 1997, the statute did
not modify veil-piercing liability for corporate torts. It only modified
derivative liability for corporate “contractual obligation.”166 But this
changed in 1997, and the additional language in (a)(2) was a natural
expansion along those lines. Here is the 1997 amendment with dele-
tions struck through and additions in italics:
A. A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares,
or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or
any affiliate thereof or of the corporation, shall be under no obliga-
tion to the corporation or to its obligees with respect to:
(1) such shares other than the obligation, if any, of such person to
pay to the corporation the full amount of the consideration, fixed
in compliance with Article 2.15 of this Act, for which such shares
were or are to be issued;
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the
holder, owner, or subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of
the corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive
161. This most famously occurred in the case of Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939
F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991), which held a corporate organizer derivatively liable for
the corporation’s contractual liability. The corporation in that case had never sold any
shares and had no directors or officers. Id. at 212.
162. This was the case in Polan. Id. at 213.
163. See, e.g., Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 337, 341
(Tex. 1968) (holding parent not liable for obligations of subsidiary “affiliated
corporation”).
164. See, e.g., Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. of Hous., 528 S.W.2d 571, 575–76 (Tex.
1975) (holding subsidiary to be alter ego of parent); Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 521 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref. n.r.e.) (par-
ent not liable for obligation of subsidiary “controlled by” it).
165. Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 1, art. 1.02.A(2), (12), (15),
1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1516 (expired Jan. 1, 2010).
166. Supra note 153 (the 1993 amendment). R
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fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, un-
less the obligee demonstrates that the holder, owner, or sub-
scriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the
purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the
obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder,
owner, or subscriber, or affiliate; or
(3) any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis of
the failure of the corporation to observe any corporate formality,
including without limitation: (a) the failure to comply with any
requirement of this Act or of the articles of incorporation or by-
laws of the corporation; or (b) the failure to observe any require-
ment prescribed by this Act or by the articles of incorporation or
bylaws for acts to be taken by the corporation, its board of direc-
tors, or its shareholders.
B. The liability of a holder, owner, or subscriber of shares of a cor-
poration or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation for an obliga-
tion that is limited by Section A of this article is exclusive and
preempts any other liability imposed on a holder, owner, or sub-
scriber of shares of a corporation or any affiliate thereof or of the
corporation for that obligation under common law or otherwise, ex-
cept that nothing contained in this article shall limit the obligation
of a holder, owner, or subscriber, or affiliate to an obligee of the
corporation when:
(1) the holder, owner, or subscriber, or affiliate has expressly as-
sumed, guaranteed, or agreed to be personally liable to the obli-
gee for the obligation; or
(2) the holder, owner, or subscriber, or affiliate is otherwise liable
to the obligee for the obligation under this Act or another appli-
cable statute.167
The reader can see what happened. When the word “contractual” was
deleted from (a)(3), the statute’s reach expanded for the first time
also to cover derivative liability for corporate torts. This expansion of
(a)(3) raised the immediate question whether (a)(2) should also ex-
pand. The legislature’s answer was “yes, but not as far as (a)(3).” The
vehicle for the expansion was the language “or any matter relating to
or arising from the obligation.” The language specifies what kind of
corporate liability besides “contractual obligation” will also be cov-
ered by the limitations in (a)(2).
The legislature obviously wanted the protections of (a)(2) to apply
more than to merely the contractual obligations of the corporation.
This must have included some tort liability, and to this extent, the 14th
has read the statute correctly. Liability in contract does not extend
beyond corporate contractual obligations, so the added language obvi-
ously meant to expand to something else. Because the statute else-
where preserves liability for statutory violations,168 this other liability
must be common law liability. Tort liability is the obvious candidate.
167. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 375, § 7.
168. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.225(2).
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But whose tort liability? Only the corporation’s. The statute’s other
language limits the reach of the statute to veil-piercing liability, and
nothing else in the statute changed. The language was inserted in the
middle of a statute addressing veil-piercing liability, not placed float-
ing freely on its own. Thus, notwithstanding that the kind of liability
named in (a)(2) is more than “any contractual obligation of the corpo-
ration” and quite clearly includes some liability in tort “relating to or
arising from” contract, the protection offered by the statute is the
same, namely, protection against veil-piercing liability—liability “on
the basis that the [person protected] is or was the alter ego of the
corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a
sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory.”169 The language
describing the basis of liability did not change in 1997: “on the basis
of,” “other similar theory,” etc.—remained identical.170 The added
language must be read in the context of the statute in which it was
placed, against the statute’s history, and the statute must be read as a
whole. Nothing changed except the description of the kind of corpo-
rate liability to which (a)(2) applied. The statute still addressed only
veil-piercing liability.
Simplified, the statute says, “C shall have no liability for E on the
basis of F.” C can be expanded to include any variety of persons. E
can be expanded to include anything, but it will always be limited by
“on the basis of F.” F in this statute is veil-piercing theory—the liabil-
ity of a corporate actor for the corporation’s obligations, and its
description remained the same in the 1997 amendments.
I imagine a counter-argument; perhaps this is a hidden premise in
the 14th’s understanding: Corporate tort liability is different from cor-
porate contractual liability. Whereas the agent of a disclosed principal
can form a contract for the corporation such that the agent is not a
party, a corporation can never be liable in tort except vicariously, so a
limit on liability for a corporation’s torts must also include a limit on
the liability of the agent who generated the liability.
The premise is false. Veil-piercing liability remains separate and dis-
tinct from direct liability for the fraud of the agent who committed the
fraud. Perhaps the objector is thinking only of cases in which the dom-
inating shareholder is the same person who committed the fraud, as in
both TecLogistics and Hong, though this should make no difference
because the bases of liability are different, and that is what matters.
Moreover, that is not the only way reality can happen. A case in which
the person committing the fraud is not the dominating shareholder (or
is one of two dominating shareholders) illustrates.
Consider the case of actor X who owns, controls, and dominates
Corporation; fails to help it perform any corporate formalities; and
169. Id. § 21.223(a)(2).
170. Id.
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strips it of its cash by distributing all profits as salary and bonuses and
commingling her own assets with Corporation’s such that it is impossi-
ble to tell where Corporation begins and X ends. Imagine X is a par-
ticularly bad actor who defrauds some unnamed clients. Now
Corporation hires Z to manage part of its business and lets Z buy
some shares. X and Z are of a similar frame of mind, which is why
they get along. Z commits fraud against Client A in the conduct of
Corporation’s business. The fraud might even also be a breach of con-
tract, like the fraud in TecLogistics. X has no contact with Client A.
Whom should Client A sue? The statute according to its language
protects X. X did not commit this fraud, so the only theory of liability
possible against X is a derivative theory, veil piercing. Since the liabil-
ity at issue is contractual (breach) and related closely to the contract
(fraud in the performance of a contract), subsection (a)(2) (and
(a)(3)) applies and protects X against any corporate liability—veil-
piercing liability. X has no direct liability because X did not commit a
tort.
But the statute does not protect Z against a direct fraud claim. The
basis of Z’s liability is not derivative, not veil-piercing; it is direct
under tort law for the fraud that Z committed. The tort of fraud is not
similar to the veil-piercing theories named in (a)(2), and the basis of
the suit against Z would not be any veil-piercing theory, so the statute
does not apply. Client A should sue Z and also Corporation itself be-
cause this fraud was within the scope of Z’s authority.
Incidentally, the statute probably protects Z from a veil-piercing
claim so long as Z did not use Corporation to commit the fraud as
required by subsection (b). Z probably did not abuse the corporate
privilege, so even if Z is liable for the fraud she committed, no veil-
piercing is warranted. In this case, the damages will be the same no
matter the ground of liability, because Corporation’s liability resulted
solely from Z’s fraudulent act within the scope of employment or au-
thority; Corporation’s liability is derivative of Z’s. But lawyers should
understand the distinction between (i) (a) Z’s direct liability for tort
and (b) Corporation’s derivative liability for Z’s tort under agency
law, on the one hand, and (ii) derivative liability for veil-piercing, on
the other.
In any event, X is not liable. X committed no fraud against Client
A. X is not liable derivatively under agency law because Corporation,
not X, is the principal. X is protected from derivative liability for veil-
piercing by the statute.
The corporate liability named in Section 21.223(a)(2)—that is con-
tractual and that is tortious but related to a contract in some way—is a
rational category for the legislature to address as a regulation of veil
piercing. That is what the statute does. Nothing in the legislative his-
tory suggests the statute was intended to do anything else. That the
basis of liability affected by Section 21.223(a)(2) and its predecessors
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remained the same throughout the amendments—every amendment
up until the present day—means that Section 21.223(a)(2) did not ex-
pand beyond veil-piercing. This conclusion is supported also by the
(one would hope) unnoticed and unintended consequences of reading
the statute as the 14th has.
B. Unexpected and Unwanted Results: When No One
Is Liable for Fraud
One of the real oddities of the 14th’s position is that it protects
fraud for which no one will be liable. Under the 14th’s theory, some-
times fraud pays. It certainly pays for the individual who commits
fraud but has no liability. The individual gains whatever personal ben-
efit she wanted from committing fraud (e.g., greater financial security
for her business, a higher year-end bonus, a promotion) and never
pays a dime to the victim. But under the 14th’s theory, sometimes no
one will be liable for fraud.
1. Whither Vicarious Liability
A corporation can be liable in tort only because of the acts of its
agents; the corporation itself is a mere legal fiction.171 Liability for
fraud in Texas can attach to the principal if the fraud was within the
agent’s scope of employment, under “respondeat superior.”172 Re-
spondeat superior liability is vicarious liability,173 not direct—“purely
of a derivative or a secondary character.”174 There may be other bases
for imposing liability for fraud on a corporation,175 but Texas law
seems to settle on vicarious liability.
171. GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618 (Tex. 1999) (“Corporations can
act only through their agents.”).
172. Bank Tex., N.A. v. Glenny, 405 S.W.3d 310, 317 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no
pet.); Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Tr., 855 S.W.2d 826, 837 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1993, writ denied); Campbell v. Hamilton, 632 S.W.2d 633, 634–35 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96,
98–99 (Tex. 1994); cf. Fink v. Anderson, 477 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The Restatement (Third) of Agency agrees, stating fraud
within the scope of the agent’s employment or apparent authority creates vicarious
liability for the principal. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.07, 7.08, 7.08
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The phrase “respondeat superior” means “let the
master answer.” It is a label for vicarious liability in tort.
173. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 847 (Tex. 2018) (“indi-
rect or vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior”); Painter v.
Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018) (“Under the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, ‘liability for one person’s fault
may be imputed to another who is himself without fault solely because of the relation-
ship between them.’”).
174. Marange v. Marshall, 402 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1966,
writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. McKown, 580 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 289 S.W.2d 300, 303
(Tex. App.—Waco 1956, no writ).
175. It is possible that the agent acts with actual authority or that the principal
ratifies the tort. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04. Evidence of actual
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But what happens to vicarious liability when the employee is not
liable? The courts following the 14th’s theory seem to have assumed
that the employer remains liable,176 but why would it? Its liability is
vicarious. Tellingly, the governmental liability version of respondeat
superior requires explicitly that “the employee would be personally
liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”177 If such is not the
case, then the employer is not liable. So, under the common law, if the
employee is not liable—and under the 14th’s theory the employee is
not—then no one is?
Section 21.223 itself leaves the vicarious liability issue wide open,
probably because it was not intended to address this kind of liability in
authority to commit a tort would be rare and solely within the principal’s control. If a
corporate board authorized the commission of a tort, liability would be direct.
One method of imposing liability for fraud on a business entity under Texas law is
known as “vice principal.” See Supply Pro, Inc. v. Ecosorb Int’l, Inc., No. 01-15-00621-
CV, 2016 WL 4543136, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] August 30, 2016,
pet. denied); e.g., Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 390–91 (Tex.
1997) (affirming the doctrine). The Supreme Court of Texas has proclaimed this kind
of liability “direct rather than vicarious.” Chrysler Ins. Co. v. Greenspoint Dodge of
Hous., Inc., 297 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. 2009) (merely citing to Hammerly Oaks). How-
ever, this label is applied primarily because the courts declare that the controlling
position of the vice principal within the business entity blurs the line between the
entity and the individual sufficient to justify punitive damages against the entity. Id.
(“As vice-principals, their acts are the acts of the corporation itself.”); Hammerly
Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 390–91 (“‘vice principal’ includes one who represents the corpo-
ration in its corporate capacity”). Hammerly Oaks also recognized that
“[c]orporations can, of course, act only through agents of some character.” 958
S.W.2d at 391 (internal quotations omitted). Even in a case of vice principal, then, the
principal’s tort liability usually depends on some agent’s having committed the tort.
When it does, liability is vicarious no matter what label the court applies to it. The
Restatement (Third) of Agency declares that “a principal’s vicarious liability turns on
whether the agent is liable. In most cases, direct liability requires fault on the part of
the principal whereas vicarious liability does not require that the principal be at
fault.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. b. Thus, liability is vicarious
even in vice principal cases when the entity’s liability depends on an agent’s commis-
sion of a tort. For example, in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.
1999), a supervisor of a supply department with authority to direct subordinates
within the department subjected them to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed rulings that the employer was liable for the tort
under respondeat superior and also for punitive damages because the supervisor was
a vice principal. Id. at 617–18. The court explained that a vice principal’s acts “may be
deemed to be the acts of the corporation itself.” Id. at 618. Liability was quite clearly
vicarious.
A corporate board would also be a vice principal. See id. (“those to whom the
master has confided the management of the whole . . . business”). But the board’s act
would also be the formal and substantive act of the corporation as principal. See TEX.
BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.401(a) (West 2019) (“the board . . . shall . . . exercise . . . the
powers of the corporation”). A board-authorized tort would therefore create direct
liability.
176. Valley Forge Motor Co. v. Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2020, no pet.), seems to assume it is part of the test (“given Sifuentes’ proof of trans-
acting all business on behalf of the corporate entity, he met his . . . burden”), but the
statute has no such requirement.
177. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(B) (West).
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the first place. Nothing in Section 21.223 mentions respondeat supe-
rior doctrines, and the statute contains no requirement that the corpo-
rate actor act within the scope of employment, with actual or apparent
authority, or in any way connected to its duties. This makes perfect
sense. The statute protects, among others, shareholders. Shareholders
are owners and have no duties and do not act within any scope. The
omission of “scope of employment” or respondeat superior doctrine
from the statute might seem like an omission, but it only seems like
that if one assumes the statute addresses the personal liability of
named corporate actors for their own torts. The issue disappears en-
tirely if one reads the entire statute in context and recognizes that it
functions solely as a limit on veil piercing.
But let us imagine the 14th’s theory holds up. What happens to vica-
rious liability? In theoretical terms, the cases speak loudly if not
clearly. In Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc.,178 the Supreme Court of
Texas opined, “[W]here the employer’s liability rests solely on respon-
deat superior, an adjudication acquitting the employee of negligence
will stand as a bar to a subsequent suit against the employer.”179 Is
dismissal under Section 21.223180 such an acquittal?
Alternatively, one could consider Section 21.223 to create some sort
of immunity, which is what I call it sometimes in this Article. If it is an
immunity, does it affect the doctrine of respondeat superior? It is dif-
ficult to say. The language of the courts is not clear. In Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff,181 the parental immunity of the supervisor did not bar an
action against the ranch in which the parent was a partner, but the
court emphasized that the “the negligence complained of in this case
is alleged to have occurred in the conduct of business activities wholly
outside the sphere of parental duties and responsibilities.”182 No such
distinction can be made with fraud committed by a corporate actor
covered by the statute under the 14th’s reading; such activities are
likely near the core of some corporate actor’s role within the organiza-
tion. They are the very reason for the immunity.183
While the Restatement (Second) of Agency suggested that an “im-
munity” personal to the employee will not prevent liability under re-
spondeat superior,184 it recognized that the cases are not uniform.185
178. Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1980).
179. Id. at 807 n.2.
180. See Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d at 878–79 (granting summary judgment to Sifuentes
alone without regard to whether a case could be made out against the employer).
181. Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
182. Id. at 933.
183. Cf. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) (making exactly
the same distinction).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1958);
see Langley v. Nat’l Lead Co., 666 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1984, no writ)
(holding interspousal immunity not helpful to employer). Langley reasoned that the
“tort is complete by itself by the husband acting in his business as distinguished from
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The Restatement (Third) seems to limit this doctrine to cases such as
Holloway involving contractual liabilities and a “privilege” to make
decisions about breach—not a bad description of Holloway.186 Should
we rather say that the corporate actors addressed by the statute have a
privilege to commit fraud?
The precedent on this issue does not generate a clear answer, and
actually, the issue itself need not be decided if the 14th’s position is
not adopted because the Texas Legislature did not intend this statute
to do what the 14th has held it did.
2. The Gap Between the Statute and Any Vicarious Liability
Even if vicarious liability for fraud continues notwithstanding the
statute’s effect, the 14th’s reading of the statute will also make fraud
pay whenever the following two conditions occur at the same time: (1)
the exemption from liability under the 14th’s theory applies but (2)
the corporation itself is not liable for the fraud.
When this would happen is easy to describe. According to the 14th’s
theory, the exemption from liability applies whenever the corporate
actor is charged with the tort of fraud or some similar theory (negli-
gent misrepresentation, say) and the fraud “relates to or arises from”
“any contractual obligation of the corporation.” Compare that
description with when a corporation will be liable for fraud. A corpo-
ration will be liable for fraud committed by its employee within the
scope of employment.187 Whenever the 14th’s theory applies to pro-
tect a corporate actor from liability for fraud but none of the laws
imposing vicarious liability for fraud apply, the corporate actor is able
to commit fraud without creating liability in tort for anyone.
How often will this happen? It is difficult to say.188 The relationship
between (i) the language that the 14th construes to cover primary lia-
bility in Section 21.223 and (ii) the laws imposing vicarious liability on
acts which arise from the discharge of normal spousal duties and responsibilities.” Id.
at 345.
185. Compare, e.g., M.J. ex rel. Beebe v. United States, 721 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.
2013) (“Under Alaska state law, an employee’s immunity from tort liability precludes
an employer from being held vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence.”); Law
v. Verde Valley Med. Ctr., 170 P.3d 701, 703–05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because the
doctors were, in the eyes of the law, adjudicated to have no liability to Plaintiff,
neither did [the employer] have any vicarious liability to Plaintiff based on the doc-
tors’ conduct.”), with Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 444–45 (Iowa 2013) (holding
that a driver’s immunity as a “state volunteer” did not preclude an action against the
state based on the driver’s negligence).
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(“Privileged conduct,” citing Holloway).
187. See supra note 172; Thomas C. Riney, Participatory and Vicarious Liability in R
Business Litigation, 37 CORP. COUNS. REV. 31, 49–55 (2018) (reviewing legal methods
for finding vicarious liability).
188. The language is completely untested in court as of yet. The importance of the
issue suggests that the Legislature did not intend to leave it to the courts to riddle out.
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principals for the fraud of their agents—that relationship is not obvi-
ous at all. It is as if the two sets of rules were drafted for entirely
different purposes (which, of course, they were).
The probability that some fraud will go unremedied persuades me
that the legislature never intended the 14th’s theory. The notion that
something as important as remedies for fraud was left to the uncertain
overlap between open-ended language drafted for placement in a veil-
piercing statute and the relatively fixed rules for vicarious liability—
this notion persuades that the legislature never intended the 14th’s
theory. And the idea that the legislature meant to allow any fraud to
go unremedied and thus encourage fraud—as any lessening of a disin-
centive for an act will at the margins encourage it—likewise suggests
that the legislature never intended such a thing.
How might this play out in litigation? Consider a case in which an
agent without authority from the principal commits fraud outside the
scope of the agent’s duties but the fraud is successful largely because
the agent’s position with the principal enables the agent to commit the
fraud.189 In Millan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,190 Maria Millan
opened two brokerage accounts at Dean Witter using her son Miguel,
a Dean Witter broker, as her broker.191 Miguel opened an additional
Dean Witter account in his mother’s name and forged her signature
on the application.192 Miguel gave this account check-writing privi-
leges and a credit card, which he used.193 He deposited his mother’s
periodic deposits into this account and wrote himself checks from it.194
He covered his tracks with a P.O. Box, false change of address form,
and false account statements purporting to be from Dean Witter.195
Millan sued her son and Dean Witter for fraud and other things.196
The trial court directed a verdict for Dean Witter on vicarious liability
theory, and the court of appeals affirmed (over a dissent).197 So Dean
Witter was not liable for the fraud of its broker Miguel. But Miguel’s
bad acts were only possible because Maria Millan opened accounts at
Dean Witter in the first place and used her son Miguel, a Dean Witter
189. This is a common occurrence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261
& cmts. a–b, reporter’s notes case citations (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“A principal who
puts a servant or other agent in a position which enables the agent, while apparently
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons is subject to liability
to such third persons for the fraud.”); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (providing for the same).
190. Millan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).






197. Id. at 763.
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employee, as her broker.198 The contractual relationship between
Dean Witter and Maria Millan was one source of the trust Miguel
violated, which was why Miguel’s fraud involved a fake account and
false Dean Witter statements.
In rejecting vicarious liability for Dean Witter, the San Antonio
court of appeals said that Miguel’s bad acts “were not related to Mi-
guel’s duties and were not within his general scope of authority as a
broker for Dean Witter.”199 “Not related to his duties” is pretty far-
fetched. But the court also conceded (1) that Miguel opened the bro-
kerage account “in the course and scope of his employment for Dean
Witter” and (2) that “[i]t was within Miguel’s general authority to
open such accounts for clients, receive deposits to these accounts, and
purchase and sell securities as directed by clients.”200 The contract be-
tween Dean Witter and Maria Millan was the stage for Miguel’s fraud
play. Even if Miguel’s fraud did not relate to his own duties, it surely
related to or arose from the contractual obligation of Dean Witter to
Maria Millan. If it did, then Miguel would not be liable for it under
the 14th’s reading, and neither would Dean Witter because vicarious
liability rules did not apply. No one would be liable for it, and Maria
Millan would be left with no remedy for fraud.
The Millan case raises one other issue. Even though Miguel would
be protected by Section 21.223(a)(2) as construed by the 14th, might
Maria employ subsection (b) to hold him liable nonetheless? Subsec-
tion (b) clarifies that subsection (a)(2) “does not prevent or limit the
liability of a[n] . . . affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that the . . .
affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpe-
trating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for
the direct personal benefit of the . . . affiliate.”201 The answer is
unclear.
Section 21.223(a)(2) only applies to protect Miguel if Maria is an
obligee of the corporation.202 Let us assume that, after the fraud, Ma-
ria no longer did business with Dean Witter. Even so, Maria remained
an obligee at the time of the litigation because the jury found Dean
Witter negligent.203 Because the statute only protects corporate obli-
gees, this finding appears necessary for Miguel to obtain statutory pro-
tection. But it also gave Maria standing to claim under subsection (b),
because subsection (b)’s limitation is also only available to an obligee.
Because she is an obligee, she can then argue that Miguel satisfied the
rest of the requirements of subsection (b). He might be liable under
subsection (b), depending on what the court thinks “caused the corpo-
198. See id. at 765–66.
199. Id. at 768.
200. Id.
201. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2019).
202. See id. § 21.223(a) (“a corporation or its obligees”).
203. Millan, 90 S.W.3d at 763.
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ration to be used for the purpose of perpetrating” means. He certainly
hid behind his office, and his use of Dean Witter’s accounts and statio-
nary suggest a use of the corporation to commit fraud, probably actual
fraud the tort. Miguel’s deceptive acts were certainly intentional and
he did pocket or divert the funds. So perhaps this application of the
statute is ok?
But what if the jury had exonerated Dean Witter? What if Dean
Witter had settled out early? Even worse, what if, as happened in
Sifuentes, the court ruled for the agent before trial without ever con-
sidering the liability of the principal (when the plaintiff was an obli-
gee),204 and then after trial ruled for the principal? Or is “obligee”
supposed to refer to a relationship established by the contract men-
tioned in (a)(2)? If it is, how long after the contract terminates does
that last? Truth is, no one knows why corporate “obligee” status in (b)
is a requirement in Maria’s tort case against Miguel. No good reason
exists not to let Maria sue Miguel for the full amount of her damages.
In the veil-piercing setting, an “obligee” requirement is always met.
Because in a veil-piercing setting the plaintiff is always also suing the
corporation, and because veil-piercing liability is always derivative of
corporate liability, the plaintiff in every veil-piercing case is an obli-
gee. But in a case like Millan, the plaintiff is an obligee of the corpora-
tion only if the case against the corporation is successful—if the
corporation still owes something. In Millan itself, the case against
Dean Witter was successful on a cause of action not necessarily re-
lated to fraud. Did the legislature actually mean the statute to apply
based on such a dice roll?
I seriously doubt that the legislature intended such a result or a re-
sult like it in any case, or even the risk of it. Fortunately, the legisla-
ture never intended the 14th’s reading.
3. The Insolvent Corporation
Even when corporate liability for fraud (and a corporate obligee)
exists, fraud will pay under the 14th’s theory when a corporate actor
covered by the statute commits fraud for the corporation while the
corporation is or is about to be insolvent. Corporate actors in control
of a business often take desperate measures to save it just before it
goes bankrupt. That is one reason that some fraud in the vicinity of
bankruptcy is addressed by Sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code.205 But the 14th’s reading may well cut back on a trustee’s pow-
ers under Bankruptcy Code Section 544, which relies on non-bank-
ruptcy law. Moreover, if the entity never files (or is forced into)
bankruptcy, the fraudster simply gets away with it. This would be the
204. Valley Forge Motor Co. v. Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d 871, 878–79 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2020, no pet.) (granting summary judgment to Sifuentes alone without regard to
whether a case could be made out against the employer).
205. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
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case under the facts of TecLogistics if TecLogistics, Inc., were unable
to pay damages for fraud.
One should not expect the desperately insolvent corporation to be
the only possible fraud pass, however. The courts should also expect a
person worried about fraud liability to create an intentionally insol-
vent corporation. After all, the 14th’s reading makes no distinction.
Any shareholder or manager of any corporation is, according to the
14th, worthy of such protection. One might object that the veil of an
undercapitalized corporation might be pierced, but undercapitaliza-
tion alone has never been sufficient to pierce a corporate veil, and it
certainly is not sufficient under Section 21.223.206 Also, if the person
never “pockets or diverts” her ill-gotten gains, veil-piercing will never
succeed under the 14th’s theory, as Hong holds207 and Part III.B de-
scribes. Besides, given the formalistic legal rules of Section 21.223,
now applied by the 14th to protect fraud, why should only business
people acting in good faith be exempt from personal liability for lying
and cheating? Treurniet was also protected.
C. More Unintended Results, Including the Corporation’s
Loss of Rights
The 14th’s reading’s (hopefully) unintended results are not limited
to leaving some fraud against third parties unremedied.
1. Exempting Fraud but Not Negligence
The statute as read by the 14th exempts the named corporate actors
from personal liability for the fraud they commit in relation to a cor-
porate contract. It does not exempt the same corporate actors from
negligence relating to those same contracts. So the agent who pads a
bill or lies to induce a contract counterparty to sign has no liability,
but an agent who negligently drives a car on corporate business re-
mains personally liable.208 One would have thought that the imposi-
206. Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804–05 (Tex. 1980); Endsley Elec., Inc. v.
Altech, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 15, 24 n.7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); Ramirez v.
Hariri, 165 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“[U]ndercapitalization
alone, even if established, is not a sufficient basis to disregard the corporation.” (a
jurisdiction case)).
207. Hong v. Havey, 551 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no
pet.).
208. Perez v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 4:19-cv-338-SDJ-KPJ, 2019 WL
7859560, at *3–5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2019) (allowing a negligence claim to go forward
against one who participated in the tortious act); Cola v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3:19-
CV-00199, 2019 WL 5558247, at *3–5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2019); Morales v. Alcoa
World Alumina L.L.C., No. 13-17-00101-CV, 2018 WL 2252901, at *12–13 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 17 2018, pet. denied) (allowing a negligence
claim to go forward against an employee who participated in the tort); Richardson v.
Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 719, 723 (S.D. Tex. 2016); Andrade v.
Terminal Link Tex., LLC, No. H-09-2214, 2009 WL 5195974, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
2009) (“[A] vehicle operator[ ] owed an independent duty to [the plaintiff] to use
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tion of personal liability was at least as effective, and even more
important, a disincentive for intentional deceit as it is for negligent
conduct, but the 14th’s reading inverts that judgment. The 14th’s posi-
tion suggests that no need exists for such a disincentive—only for
negligence.
2. Shareholders and Affiliates Who Commit Fraud
Against the Corporation
The 14th’s reading expands (a)(2)’s limitation beyond veil-piercing
liability and claims that it limits personal liability for the torts the cor-
porate actor commits against a corporate obligee. Section (a)(2) as
read by the 14th now also limits corporate actors’ liability to the cor-
poration itself! This is plain from the language of subsection (a), which
says,
A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest . . . , or any
affiliate of such a holder, owner, . . . or of the corporation, may not
be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to . . .
any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating
to or arising from the obligation . . . .209
When (a)(2) was understood to apply only to derivative, veil-piercing
liability, the liability of a corporate actor to the corporation itself was
not at issue; that subject is never addressed in a veil-piercing suit. But
the 14th’s theory applies to personal liability, so it is not limited by the
veil-piercing context or the elements and effect of veil-piercing theo-
ries. The 14th thinks that liability protected under (a)(2) can be on the
basis of any kind of fraud theory. If the 14th is right, then subsection
(a)(2) also prohibits a corporation from suing its own managers and
employees for a variety of fraud.
One would think that if the legislature intended to exempt from
personal liability corporate actors who commit fraud on the corpora-
tion, that notion would have been more explicit in the statute. This is
not a result addressed in any of the 14th’s cases, but the applicability
of TecLogistics to manager and employee fraud against the corpora-
tion is unavoidable under the statute’s language. Under the language
of subsection (a), liability to the corporation and its obligees is treated
identically. The low probability of this far-reaching and severe change
being relatively hidden in a veil-piercing statute, in a 1997 amendment
reasonable care in his operation of the vehicle.”); Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114,
117 (Tex. 1996) (“[A]n agent whose negligence causes an auto accident may be held
individually liable along with his or her employer when driving in the course and
scope of employment.”). The same would not be true if the employer were a govern-
mental unit. See Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018).
But with the government, the plaintiff must elect either the employer or the em-
ployee; someone will be liable. This is not true of the 14th’s reading of Section 21.223.
209. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-1\TWL104.txt unknown Seq: 46 28-OCT-20 7:24
46 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
that by itself addressed no such thing, strongly suggests that the 14th
has misread the statute.
Permutations of insider fraud on the corporation are almost too nu-
merous to name. Are not the following covered under this standard?
i) The shareholder, manager, or employee who lies to the corpora-
tion in order to sell the corporation overpriced property or services.
ii) The manager or employee (the officer who exercises some con-
trol over the corporation and as an agent is controlled by it, or the
lower-level employee who is controlled by it) who pads a reim-
bursement request for even authorized acts. This is the same act
committed by Treurniet,210 but there is no reason to think the result
should be different under the 14th’s theory if the victim is the cor-
poration. The same language mandates the same result.
(iii) The shareholder or affiliate who promises anything to the cor-
poration without any intention to fulfill the promise. This is promis-
sory fraud, and it occurred in Hong v. Havey against the
corporation’s obligee. The 14th will have to treat promissory fraud
against the corporation in the same way.
The startling thing about all of these instances is, as noted above, that
there is not even a hope of preserving liability for them. Section
21.223 as a veil-piercing statute wisely preserved liability for acts of
real fraud in subsection (b), and when those occur, the statute allows
the corporate obligee to recover the corporate obligation from the
shareholder, officer, or other corporate actor. But subsection (b) only
allows a remedy to a corporate obligee. There is no such preservation
for liability to the corporation itself. Under the 14th’s theory, the cor-
porate actor can perpetrate actual fraud against the corporation for
her direct personal benefit, to use the statute’s language, and the stat-
ute protects her from liability.
3. No Indemnity or Contribution from the Corporate Actor
The 14th’s reading of the statute may create another, equally dra-
matic effect: When a corporate actor such as Treurniet—be she direc-
tor, officer, other manager, or employee—commits a fraud as agent of
the corporation such that the corporation itself becomes vicariously
liable, the corporation can no longer seek indemnity from the corpo-
rate actor who actually committed the fraud.
Respondeat superior doctrine can attach liability for fraud to a cor-
porate principal.211 Respondeat superior liability is vicarious,212 not
210. See generally TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
211. Bank Tex., N.A. v. Glenny, 405 S.W.3d 310, 317 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no
pet.); Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Tr., 855 S.W.2d 826, 837 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1993, writ denied); Campbell v. Hamilton, 632 S.W.2d 633, 634–35 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96,
98–99 (Tex. 1994).
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direct—“purely of a derivative or a secondary character.”213 Under
respondeat superior, a corporation without fault—not a tortfeasor—
becomes liable for the tort of another.214 The doctrine is “a deliberate
allocation of risk” to a non-tortfeasor because that non-tortfeasor “is
in a position to exercise some general control over the situation”;215
allocation of risk to the person in control encourages the controlling
actor to improve the conduct of the agents it has the right to direct.
Other kinds of vicarious liability also exist, such as the vice principal
doctrine.216 These doctrines are means by which a corporation, itself a
fiction, becomes liable to pay tort damages. TecLogistics, Inc., became
liable for the fraud of Treurniet vicariously.217
The common law right of indemnity protects a defendant whose lia-
bility is “purely vicarious.”218 Without the 14th’s reading of the stat-
ute, agents who subject their principals to vicarious liability for fraud
because of acts they commit within the scope of their authority are
liable to the principal to indemnify the principal for the amounts the
principal must pay to the victims of the agents’ fraud.219 However,
when the 14th’s reading of the statute applies to protect a corporate
212. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 847 (“indirect or vicarious liability under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior”); Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125,
130 (Tex. 2018) (“Under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicari-
ous liability, ‘liability for one person’s fault may be imputed to another who is himself
without fault solely because of the relationship between them.’”).
213. Marange v. Marshall, 402 S.W.2d 236, 238–240 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. McKown, 580 S.W.2d 435, 443
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 289 S.W.2d 300,
303 (Tex. App.—Waco 1956, no writ).
214. See Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 130–31.
215. Id. at 131 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984)).
216. E.g., Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997); supra note
175. R
217. See generally TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). It is possible that Treurniet as the
board of TecLogistics, Inc., authorized the corporation to commit fraud, in which case
TecLogistics could have been found directly liable, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.03(a)(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006), but the case reported no evidence of
any such authorization. Such evidence, while possible, would be extremely rare and
entirely within the defendants’ control. Courts also sometimes separately justify cor-
porate liability for fraud on the doctrine of apparent authority. See id. § 7.04; Chubb
& Son Inc. v. Consoli, 726 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
218. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 677 (Tex. 2018); Vecellio Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 127 S.W.3d 134, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
219. See Vecellio Ins. Agency, 127 S.W.3d at 139; see Homes v. Arias & Assocs.,
Inc., No. SA-12-CA-53-OG, 2012 WL 12886509, at *10–12 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2012);
De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rasa Floors, LP, No. 08-0533, 2010 WL 742625, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2010) (applying Texas law); Quilling ex rel. ABC Viaticals, Inc. v.
Erwin & Johnson, LLP, No. 3:07-CV-1153-P, 2010 WL 11618033, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 13, 2010); J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 202–05 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); St. Anthony’s Hosp. v. Whitfield, 946
S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
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agent, that agent is not liable to the corporation for fraud or similarly
tortious conduct relating to or arising from any contractual obligation
of the corporation. For this reason, the corporation cannot recover
indemnity from the employee. The corporation’s liability carrier who
has a right of subrogation also cannot recover from the employee.
Thus, TecLogistics, Inc., could not recover from Treurniet the fraud
damages she caused it to pay because of her fraud. The same would be
true of any corporation seeking to recover indemnity from an execu-
tive who had committed some fraud-like tort within the scope of her
authority; the merely vicariously liable corporation would bear the lia-
bility alone.
Texas courts have also held that “[t]here is no right of indemnity
against a defendant who is not liable to the plaintiff.”220 Because the
corporate actor protected by the statute is not liable to the corpora-
tion’s obligee, the corporate actor is also not liable to the corporation
for indemnity. For this reason also, TecLogistics, Inc., could not re-
cover from the defrauding employee under the 14th’s reading of the
statute.
A similar analysis holds for contribution. “[C]ontribution and in-
demnity are distinct concepts.”221 “[I]ndemnity involves a shift in re-
sponsibility for payment of damages . . . whereby one pays the entire
amount due by another.”222 Contribution, on the other hand, is an
obligation to make up one’s share of common liability.223 Because the
liability must be common, contribution is not “recoverable from a
party against whom the injured party has no cause of action.”224 Be-
cause under the 14th’s reading of the statute the corporate obligee has
no cause of action against the corporate actor who committed the
fraud, the corporation and its insurer will shoulder the liability for the
fraud alone.
What would this mean in a litigation context? Consider J.M.K. 6,
Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C.,225 a decision by the 14th Court of Ap-
peals itself. The corporation J.M.K. 6, Inc., (“JMK”) hired Gregg as its
agent to do the legal work of converting apartments to condos.226 In
the course of his work, Gregg allegedly participated in a phone call
with JMK and two potential buyers of condos, in which Gregg repre-
220. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. 1989); accord Ve-
cellio Ins. Agency, 127 S.W.3d at 138.
221. Lee Lewis Const., Inc. v. Harrison, 64 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1999), aff’d, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001).
222. Id.
223. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1987) (“The essential
prerequisites for a contribution claim are a judgment finding the party seeking contri-
bution to be a joint tortfeasor and the payment by such party of a disproportionate
share of the common liability.”).
224. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tex. 1981).
225. J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
226. Id. at 193.
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sented that the conversion was complete and that the condos could be
sold.227 But the conversion was held up by the local government be-
cause the government considered the conversion incomplete, and the
buyers sued JMK for fraud.228 JMK, in turn, sued Gregg for contribu-
tion and indemnity.229
The 14th denied Gregg summary judgment on the fraud claim, leav-
ing him open to a jury finding that he committed the tort.230 The 14th
also denied Gregg summary judgment on JMK’s claims for contribu-
tion and indemnity.231 For contribution, the 14th held that “both a
principal and an agent can be held liable for their participation in tor-
tious activity.”232 For both contribution and indemnity, the court
noted that Gregg’s conduct could render his principal vicariously
liable.233
These are just the kind of claims superseded by the 14th’s reading of
Section 21.223. The claims of fraud relate to or arise out of a contract
of the corporation, both the sale of the condos to the plaintiffs and
JMK’s retention of Gregg as its attorney. The allegation in J.M.K. 6
was fraud in the inducement of a contract, just as in Hong.234 Under
the 14th’s reading of the statute, Gregg was therefore not “liable to
the corporation or its obligees.”235 Gregg was arguably an “affiliate”
because as an agent of the corporation he was subject to its control.236
Gregg could thus render his employer subject to participatory or vica-
rious liability, but the corporation could never collect from the person
whose misrepresentations caused it liability.
In this way, the 14th’s reading of the statute limits the rights of busi-
nesses to obtain a recovery from the very person who caused them a
loss. Instead, the effect of the statute is to make the employer the
ultimate insurer of losses caused by employee fraud. I think it doubt-
ful that the Texas Legislature meant by this obscure language in a veil-
piercing statute to impose such a shift in loss risk onto corporations
and limited liability companies, yet that is the result of the expansion
the 14th claims.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 192.
229. Id. at 193.
230. See id. at 203–04.
231. Id. at 202–04.
232. Id. at 203.
233. Id. at 202–04.
234. See Hong v. Havey, 551 S.W.3d 875, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, no pet.).
235. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a) (West 2019).
236. J.M.K. 6, 192 S.W.3d at 204 (“Gregg has neither asserted nor attempted to
prove that its alleged representations fell outside Gregg’s role as J.M.K.’s agent or the
scope of Gregg’s authority.”).
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4. Employee Exemption from Fraud, or Immunity
for the Price of a Share
Another direct result of the 14th’s reading is to greatly expand the
number and kind of persons protected by the statute from fraud
liability.
When the statute is limited to its historical purpose, namely, limiting
and defining derivative liability under the veil-piercing theories the
statute lists, the number of persons protected by subsection (a)(2) is
naturally small. As noted in Part III.A,237 the veil-piercing theories
referred to in (a)(2) require generally that the corporation be abused
in some way—that “the corporate form has been used as part of a
basically unfair device to achieve an inequitable result.”238 Only a cor-
porate actor with control of the corporation could achieve this abuse.
A controlling shareholder certainly could, as could a dominant direc-
tor or officer (affiliates, both). Even a non-director manager whose
superiors in the corporate structure gave her free rein could abuse the
corporation in this manner (also an affiliate). But the veil-piercing
theories named in Section 21.223 placed a legal limit on who could be
sued for the corporation’s obligations, whether in contract or tort, as
specified in Section 21.223.
The theories were not facially limited to shareholders, directors, or
officers, so it makes sense for a statute limiting such derivative liability
to reach out and, in a slightly overbroad manner, sweep up in its
description of who is protected anyone who might be in a position to
control. Thus, all shareholders are included,239 as are (as “affiliates”)
others—directors, officers, non-officer managers—who might control
the corporation. The statute also includes those who might be con-
trolled by the corporation such as subsidiaries likely to be included in
the kind of “joint enterprise” theory raised in SSP Partners.240 In a
veil-piercing statute, the kinds of actors included in Section 21.223’s
protections make perfect sense. So long as a veil-piercing theory was
required to be proved as part of producing liability under subsection
(a)(2) and subsection (b) (which requires that the corporate actor
“caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating”
237. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64 and accompanying text. R
238. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454–56 (Tex.
2008) (quoting at length Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271–72 (Tex.
1986)).
239. The inclusion of shareholders in the protection of the statute is also driven by
the legislature’s choice in 1989, when the corporate code was first amended to address
veil-piercing, to place the limitation on veil-piercing in a statute about liability for
share subscriptions rather than craft a new statute. See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, 54th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 64, art. 2.21, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 239, 252 (amended 1989) (expired Jan. 1,
2010), https://lrl.texas.gov/LASDOCS/71R/SB1427/SB1427_71R.pdf#page=1 [https://
perma.cc/54L8-R6PH]. The language in the preamble of subsection (a) thus must
cover (a)(1) as well as (a)(2).
240. SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 454–56.
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fraud241), the kind of actors who were protected by the statute was
legally limited to those who could be derivatively liable under a veil-
piercing theory—necessarily only those with control (or those con-
trolled by those who have control, as a subsidiary might be).
But the 14th’s theory steps around all that. Under the 14th’s theory,
subsection (a)(2) addresses the personal liability of the corporate ac-
tor for her own torts. She does not need to control the corporation or
be controlled by it pursuant to a veil-piercing theory if the 14th is
correct, so under the 14th’s view the statute expands from protecting
corporate actors in control to anyone in the categories of actors
named. Who is this? For starters, under this broadened protection,
employees and all agents of the corporation appear to be included.
This is so because the test for agency requires that the principal and
agent agree that the agent will be subject to the principal’s control.242
All agents then, when acting as such, are affiliates. This would not
matter under the common understanding of the statute because veil-
piercing liability would never reach all common agents. But under the
14th’s theory, the statute expands from protecting corporate actors
with control to protecting anyone with the status of agent. The em-
ployees and the corporation’s accountant and lawyer appear to be
covered.
The effect of the 14th’s theory also renders the statute’s protections
for sale. Again, because veil-piercing theories could only be brought
against persons with control, the statute’s reliance on those theories
puts a natural limit on who was protected—only those who exercise
such control. Control is something one exercises. But under the 14th’s
theory, the statute protects every covered person against personal lia-
bility for fraud. No control is required. So now the statute protects all
shareholders. Even if for some reason a court unduly restricted the
plain meaning of “affiliate” so that it did not include employees, sell-
ing each employee a share would provide the same protection. That is
cheap insurance! Of course, it is not clear that a corporation would
want all of its employees covered, as that might also protect them
against liability to the corporation for fraud when the corporation was
the victim,243 but with share ownership the corporation could pick and
choose.
241. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2019).
242. Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. 2018);
Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 697 (Tex. 2017) (“To
establish an agency relationship, one must show a manifestation of consent by the
purported agent to act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,
together with a manifestation of consent by the purported principal authorizing his
agent to act.”).
243. One might argue that “affiliate” status would cease when the employee com-
mitted fraud against the corporation, but the definition depends on control, not inter-
est. Even if this could occur, the statute’s protection would continue for a corporate
shareholder whether or not she is an affiliate.
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It seems unlikely that the legislature meant the statute to protect all
managers and employees against liability for the personal torts they
commit, even on behalf of the business, let alone against the busi-
ness.244 It seems unlikely also that, in lieu of employee status, a person
could buy fraud immunity for personally committed torts for the price
of a share of stock—especially fraud immunity from the corporation
whose stock she purchased. The legislature is unlikely to grant for the
price of a share a personal immunity from tort law for fraud a person
commits.
5. Dis the Partnership
Under the 14th’s reading of Section 21.223, the corporation and the
limited liability company carry with them a significant exemption from
personal liability for fraud. Because the statute only applies to corpo-
rations and limited liability companies, the effect of the 14th’s reading
is that these business entities now come with a benefit that other enti-
ties with limited liability, such as the limited liability partnership or
limited partnership, do not.
Under the common understanding of the statute, this effect was not
possible. Limited partnerships are considered in some ways aggre-
gates, not separate, stand-alone entities like corporations.245 Because
they are not separate entities, their general partners are liable for the
contractual and tort liability of the partnership.246 Because another
method of imposing entity liability on owners existed, courts declined
to impose veil-piercing doctrines on limited partnerships.247 There was
therefore no need to protect partnership actors from veil-piercing lia-
bility, and Section 21.223 was naturally written only in the corporate
code and extended only otherwise to limited liability companies.
But partnerships, including limited partnerships, can now opt to be
treated in effect as separate entities with limited liability,248 and the
244. See supra note 243.
245. A limited partnership is governed as a partnership to the extent partnership
law is not displaced by specific provision of the limited partnership code. TEX. BUS.
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.003 (West 2006). General partners are thus treated much
like partners in a general partnership. For such general partners, legal title to partner-
ship property may be held in the name of a partner. Id. § 152.102(a)(2). Each “partner
is an agent of the partnership for purpose of its business,” id. § 152.301, and “all part-
ners are jointly and severally liable for all obligations of the partnership” by default.
Id. § 152.304. The aggregate nature of partnership rules is strong enough that the code
drafters felt a need to reverse it as a general default. See id. § 152.056 (“A partnership
is an entity distinct from its partners.”).
246. See id. § 152.302–.304.
247. Asshauer v. Wells Fargo Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2008, pet. denied); Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n,
77 S.W.3d 487, 499 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
248. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §§ 152.801, 153.351–.353.
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code now declares that they are such.249 The law is clearly moving in
the direction of contractual freedom in entity choice.
The 14th’s decisions step backward, however. The 14th has declared
that a statute only covering actors in the corporate and limited liability
context have a personal exemption from liability for fraud that they
themselves commit. This is a significant economic benefit to corporate
actors, especially small business actors who may well be able to aban-
don the entity and ensure that their fraud victims never recover. Be-
cause this limitation on tort law extends far beyond veil-piercing, it
would be equally beneficial, and could apply equally, to partners in
limited liability partnerships. But it does not—primarily because it is
buried in a statute on veil-piercing in language that reaches the 14th’s
result only when part of the statute is ignored. What the 14th imagines
is a step forward for corporations and limited liability companies is a
step backward in the TBOC’s movement to harmonize limited liability
entities. This also suggests that the 14th’s result is not what the legisla-
ture intended.
D. No Way to Contract Around
How would one contract around the 14th’s rule? There is no way to
do it, I think. One makes contracts with the entity, not the employees
or shareholders. The employees are not going to sign an agreement
waiving their immunity from fraud in favor of a counterparty of their
employer. However, counterparties should seek such things under the
14th’s rule.
Employers, on the other hand, should immediately begin asking
employees to waive their immunity under Section 21.223. Employees
should not do so, but the necessity that their employers ask them to is
also an effect of the 14th’s theory.
V. JUSTIFICATION
A. An Exemption from Tort Law
Beyond all of these things, the 14th’s result is hard to rationalize.
What justifies a legislative exemption from direct and personal tort
liability for fraud committed by the owners and controllers of, and
those controlled by, corporations and LLCs?
This is difficult to imagine. Trust makes a market possible and suc-
cessful; it makes freedom of contract possible. The “rules of the game”
in a free economy require that businesses make profits “without de-
ception or fraud.”250 And “the role of government . . . is to do some-
249. Id. §§ 1.002(22), 152.056.
250. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th Anniversary ed.
2002).
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thing that the market cannot do for itself, namely, to . . . enforce the
rules of the game.”251
Contractual freedom depends on legal protection against fraud:
The case in favor of freedom rests on the postulate of mutual gains
through trade. The rationale for this institution provides the essen-
tial clue for its limitation. When bargaining takes place in settings
where mutual gain is not the probable outcome, there is sufficient
warrant for the law to step in to set that transaction aside. Transac-
tions will never go forward when both sides expect to lose; conse-
quently the greatest danger lurks when one side to the bargain is
made better off by an exchange that is likely to make the other side
worse off.252
The dangers of fraud, or indeed any misrepresentation, . . . can
arise in any transaction. If goods worth $10 are represented by the
seller as being worth $12, then the buyer who pays $11 ends up
worse off for having traded under false information. Misrepresenta-
tion blocks the mutual gain, and is all the more likely to occur when
deceit is practiced.253
[Thus,] [w]ith respect to the intentional infliction of harm, the
conclusion is too clear to require extended discussion. If harms may
be routinely inflicted on purpose, the rules of protection are gutted
from the outset, and autonomy and property quickly tumble.254
For these reasons, “[n]o one doubts” that the fraud victim “has her
action” against the deceiver “for fraud”255—until now, anyway, when
the 14th has declared an exemption from hundreds of years of tort law
wisdom.
Fraud is, as Posner wrote, “not a conflict between legitimate (pro-
ductive) activities but a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant in
a setting of low transaction costs.”256 Why would the legislature legal-
ize it? “[I]f such transfers were permitted, owners would spend heavily
on protection and thieves would spend heavily on thwarting the own-
ers’ protective efforts. Their joint expenditures would be wasted from
a social standpoint; this waste is the economic objection to theft.”257
251. Id. at 27.
252. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 80 (1995).
253. Id. at 81. Epstein further argues,
[O]nly the committed opponents of laissez faire are bold enough to claim
that the principal of freedom of contract is so absolute that this class of de-
fenses is excluded. The sensible advocates of laissez faire all recognize that
the power of contract lives and dies with the presupposition of mutual gain
for self-interested parties on which it rests . . . .
Id. at 82.
254. Id. at 92.
255. Id. at 195.
256. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205 (7th ed. 2007). “The
liar makes a positive investment in manufacturing and disseminating misinformation.
This investment is wasted from a social standpoint . . . .” Id. at 111.
257. Id. at 205.
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Fraud prevention, like theft prevention, is a core function of
government.
And it is not as if the protections left in place are going to discour-
age fraud enough. The level of criminal prosecution for fraud in Hous-
ton is not nearly sufficient to make up for the loss of tort law
protections. Even if it were, criminal prosecution is hardly compensa-
tory in a manner necessary to discourage fraud and encourage free-
dom of contract in the way tort law provides.
Tort law provides optimal disincentive for fraud by providing dam-
ages for fraud and holding out the real possibility of punitive damages.
Such damages are necessary to maintain freedom of contract. A con-
sideration of losses in case of fraud shows this to be the case.
For instance, suppose the law provided no tort liability, as the 14th’s
theory allows. Then the fraud victim is left with, at best, rescission of a
contract, and at worst, nothing at all. If the law provides only that
fraud grants rescission of a contract, then the fraud victim must pay
the transaction costs to rescind and can only obtain back the value
taken by fraud. If that were all the law provided, then the fraud victim
has lost the costs of rescission and missed out on lost opportunities,
but the fraudster is out nothing. Given that not all fraud victims will
rescind, such a regime would make fraud pay; the defrauder’s lack of
real loss would make tricking people out of their property profitable.
The situation is not helped much if fraud is remedied merely by
requiring the defrauder to pay the fraud victim the true cost of the
exchange. This is an improvement, but the fraud victim must still pay
the costs of enforcement. Moreover, the fraud victim is tricked into
the transaction in the first place and so has been deprived of the pro-
cess of contracting with an honest counterparty, and the value of this
lost opportunity is economic waste.258 Even more importantly, the de-
frauder has managed to keep what it bargained for in the transaction.
The defrauder has through the fraud forced a transfer of property that
would not have happened without the fraud; in this way, fraud re-
mains equivalent to theft. And given that not all fraud victims will
notice the fraud and take the initiative to sue for damages, the de-
frauder might across a number of similar transactions benefit from the
fraud enough to make it pay even more.
The only way to ensure that the intentional defrauder does not take
more from the transaction than the victim suffers is to grant damages
in addition to the value of the thing traded had it been as represented.
This is often the role that punitive damages play in a fraud case.259
For all these reasons, granting an exemption from tort liability for
fraud discourages freedom of contract.
258. Bates Energy Oil & Gas v. Complete Oilfield Servs., 361 F. Supp. 3d 633 (W.D.
Tex. 2019), is an excellent example of this kind of waste.
259. POSNER, supra note 256, at 111–14.
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B. An Unequal Exemption
The statute as framed by the 14th also renders the law oddly une-
qual without any supporting rationale. Sole proprietors, partners
(even partners of a limited liability partnership), non-profit entities,
and employees of these all remain liable for the fraud they commit.
The parties defrauded by those persons whom the 14th claims are pro-
tected by the statute would themselves be personally liable for the
fraud they commit against the persons protected by the statute. In
fact, everyone who commits fraud is liable for the tort—except the
corporate actors named in Section 21.223, according to the 14th Court
of Appeals. This inequality of treatment cries out for a policy justifica-
tion, not just a reference to a relatively obscure veil-piercing statute.
I cannot think what justification could exist. The economic circum-
stances of the corporate actors supposedly protected by the 14th’s de-
cisions are not different in any relevant way from the economic
circumstances of hundreds of thousands of other economic actors. The
difference is especially stark for the non-controlling shareholder, the
one who has no say in the business. This person bought a share and
now can lie to contract counterparties with impunity. Or consider the
common employee, assuming such is an “affiliate.” What makes the
corporate employee different from the employee of any other busi-
ness? Why should these be exempt from personal responsibility for
the lies they tell, harming common trust and contractual freedom,
when every other economic actor is—quite rightly—made to pay the
harm caused by their intentional lies?
C. What the Commentators Say
The few commentators who have argued for the 14th’s result do not
suggest much in the way of rationale.
Glenn West suggests that corporate actors, especially agents, are lia-
ble for the torts they commit within the scope of their agency only
because of their agency: “The second exception to the general rule of
agent non-liability is that an agent will be personally liable for torts
individually committed by that agent, even if she commits those torts
solely within the scope of her agency.”260 In this statement, West
reduces the ground of liability to the wrong source, as explained
above in Part IV.A.2.261 Each person subject to the law has a duty not
to intentionally harm another person. Tortfeasors are liable because
they commit torts. That the principal is also liable is an add-on from
260. West & Nelson, supra note 151, at 804; see also West & Treadway, supra note
151, at 811–12 (“[I]t is a settled principle of agency law that the agent can be liable for
his or her own torts even when acting within the scope . . . .”).
261. See supra notes 135–146 and accompanying text. R
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agency law. That the agent remains liable is not a result of agency
law.262 It is the result of tort law.
Without acknowledging this, West claims there is a difference:
In torts unrelated to the negotiation of freely bargained contracts,
the authors acknowledge that there are sound policy reasons for
holding agents personally liable for intentional torts in the services
of their corporate principals. Certainly the defense of “I was only
following orders” should never be countenanced in such circum-
stances. The authors believe, however, that torts arising from con-
tractual arrangements are fundamentally different . . . .263
But West never says how they are fundamentally different. Could they
be? I cannot think why. They are the economic equivalent of theft.
What West is worried about is probably revealed in an earlier com-
ment. After noting that corporate actors normally are personally lia-
ble for the torts they commit, West complains,
However, when a corporate officer acting on behalf of his or her
corporate employer in connection with a transaction is personally
sued for fraud, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, neg-
ligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with contract or simi-
lar torts arising out of contractual negotiation, there is an immediate
reaction by the corporate lawyer that the officer cannot possibly be
personally liable because, after all, he or she is acting solely on be-
half of the corporation.264
I assume that West is not advocating that corporate actors should be
able to commit fraud with impunity on behalf of their businesses.
Probably, West’s gripe is that too many business actors are caught up
in corporate litigation without good reason. Plaintiffs’ attorneys raise
personal claims against corporate actors for tactical reasons, and with-
out a clear basis in fact, with the result that contract litigation has an
unwarranted and more serious impact on corporate actors than it
should.265 If this is what West means, we might all sympathize.266 No
262. Agency law leaves the effects of tort law in place. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). This is probably what West had in
mind. Agency law attributes the ground of that liability to tort, however. See id. cmt. b
(“The justification for this basic rule is that a person is responsible for the legal conse-
quences of torts committed by that person. A tort committed by an agent constitutes a
wrong to the tort victim independently of the capacity in which the agent committed
the tort. The injury suffered by the victim of a tort is the same regardless of whether
the tortfeasor acted independently or happened to be acting as an agent or employee
of another person.”).
263. West & Nelson, supra note 151, at 805 n.32.
264. West & Treadway, supra note 151, at 812.
265. This appears to be the rationale of Chamberlain and DeLeon, also. See Cham-
berlain & DeLeon, supra note 136, at 1 (“There are reasons for a Plaintiff to pursue a
corporate or limited liability company (LLC) officer or owner/member individually—
personal vendetta, the corporation may be insolvent, or the Plaintiff doesn’t want the
company to suffer for what they view as the responsibility of the officer or owner.”).
The authors miss the point that individuals should be held liable for the wrongs they
intentionally commit. They seem to have forgotten that tort law quite rightly requires
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one wants to be personally in someone’s crosshairs, especially if they
really were acting innocently and only in an agent role and not for
themselves.
But it should be obvious that overclaiming by plaintiffs’ attorneys
does not justify an exemption from tort law for a large class of busi-
ness actors. If fraud is too easy to allege, make it harder to allege. If
fraud is too easy to prove, make it harder to prove. Note also that
principals owe their agents a duty of indemnity for false accusations of
tort that are leveled against them for their actions as agents,267 and
this indemnity obligation includes a duty to defend.268 Perhaps the ob-
ligation to indemnify and defend needs to be strengthened. Exempt-
ing corporate actors from personal responsibility entirely, merely
because allegations are too easily made, is not good governance. Alle-
gations of child and spouse abuse are also too easily made, and a sim-
ple fix would be to exempt from liability the actions of men toward
their wives and children. But that is not a good solution because abuse
personal responsibility for harm done to others. They warn against conflating the
owners and the entity, yet this appears to be exactly what they have done. Id. They
also use the phrase “corporate shield” as if it meant something far more than that the
corporation is a separate entity, as if creating a corporation somehow changed one’s
relationship to other people. Id. at 1, 3, 6, 10.
266. The El Paso case, Valley Forge Motor Co. v. Sifuentes, 595 S.W.3d 871 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.), involved a claim against Ruben Sifuentes, who repre-
sented himself on appeal. One sympathizes with Mr. Sifuentes, who repaired a Mus-
tang for Hill before finding out Hill did not own the vehicle. Id. at 873. Mr. Sifuentes
tried to obtain payment for his work by filing a mechanics lien on the car and then
foreclosing on the lien. Id. at 873–74. This is hardly the stuff of fraud. Why do the trial
courts allow such fluffy charges? Fixing fraud law is where the courts should spend
their efforts. Mr. Sifuentes was likely not a party to any contract. Rather than deal
with the claims on the merits, the court declared Mr. Sifuentes was “shielded” from
liability for the fraud and other claims. Id. at 876, 878. Incidentally, the El Paso court
quite recently did not see Section 21.223 as relevant. See Chico Auto Parts & Serv.,
Inc. v. Crockett, 512 S.W.3d 560, 570–75 & nn. 6–7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet.
denied) (reviewing the statute at length but concluding, “a plaintiff may sue a corpo-
ration’s affiliate for his torts, including fraud, without the need to pierce the corporate
veil”).
267. See, e.g., Oats v. Dublin Nat’l Bank, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tex. 1936) (“the es-
tablished rule that a principal is bound to indemnify his agent for loss resulting proxi-
mately from the good faith execution of the agency”); e.g., Bellefonte Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1986); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 & cmts. b, d (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“In the absence of an
express contractual provision that requires the principal to indemnify an agent in con-
nection with litigation against the agent, a principal has a duty to indemnify the agent
against expenses and other losses incurred by the agent in defending against actions
brought by third parties if the agent acted with actual authority in taking the action
challenged by the third party’s suit.”). But see Godwin v. Jessell, No. 05-99-01824-CV,
2001 WL 111558 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 9, 2001, no pet.) (rejecting a right of indem-
nity as contrary to the state’s proportionate responsibility statute).
268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(“An agent seeking indemnification has a prior duty to give timely notice to the prin-
cipal of the third party’s suit so that the principal may provide the agent with a
defense.”).
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actually occurs and its commission is too serious to exempt from liabil-
ity. The same is true of fraud.
How does one explain the difference in the law’s treatment of con-
tracts and torts? Any number of authorities explain the rule, and we
have named many of them earlier in Part IV.A.2. Leitch v. Hornsby269
indicated that whether the agent owed an independent duty would
control the issue. The Supreme Court of Texas later clarified, “[T]he
legal duty not to fraudulently procure a contract is separate and inde-
pendent from the duties established by the contract itself.”270 Leitch
cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which holds, “An agent
who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the
fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of
the principal . . . .”271 Note the language: “an agent . . . is not re-
lieved.”272 That is the key. Agency law does not relieve an agent from
liability that the agent already has under tort law.
A corporation has power to “make contracts.”273 A corporation
does this when it authorizes its agent to make a contract on its behalf.
When an agent discloses the existence and identity of its principal and
acts only on the principal’s behalf in forming a contract, the principal
and not the agent is liable.274 This rule of agency law is exactly what
one would also expect from contract law. Because contractual liability
arises from promising—from some agreement to take some future ac-
tion—it is absent for the agent when the agent acts merely as an agent
on behalf of a disclosed and identified principal. No one would think
that the agent had promised.
Fraud is quite a different matter. Liability for fraud arises from
making a misrepresentation.275 Anyone whose conduct meets the ele-
ments of the tort has committed fraud.276 Agency law does not relieve
defrauders of liability merely because, in addition to committing
269.  Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996).
270. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960
S.W.2d 41, 46–47 (Tex. 1998) (“[A]n independent legal duty, separate from the exis-
tence of the contract itself, precludes the use of fraud to induce a binding agree-
ment.”) (holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude a fraudulent
inducement claim).
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
272. Id.
273. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.101(5) (West 2019).
274. E.g., Eppler, Guerin & Turner, Inc. v. Kasmir, 685 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
275. Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018) (“Texas has long im-
posed a duty to abstain from inducing another to enter into a contract through the use
of fraudulent misrepresentations.”). Incidentally, in Anderson, Durant was personally
liable for the fraudulent inducement that his businesses also committed. Id. at 610,
613–17 (identifying Durant as the majority shareholder of Jerry Durant Auto Group,
Inc., which was found liable for fraud (along with two subsidiary corporations) for the
same false promise for which Jerry Durant was found liable). Under the 14th’s hold-
ing, such a result would be impossible.
276. See id. at 614.
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fraud, they were also working for someone at the time, or even com-
mitted fraud on behalf of another. The elements of fraud are not dif-
ferent for employees, and “was not working for someone else at the
time” is not an element of fraud. This makes perfect sense. The duty
not to lie, cheat, and steal is a duty of our common humanity, en-
forced by courts in the interest of civilization and economic coopera-
tion. One should not get a pass from such duties merely because one
was working for someone else at the time.277
VI. CONCLUSION
We have come a long way. In 1993, a federal judge in east Texas was
asked to apply the law of Kazakhstan to a case involving Kazakhs and
Texans.278 Kazakh law was argued because “the law of Republic of
Kazakhstan precludes recovery against employee tortfeasors acting
within the course and scope of their employment.”279 The law re-
flected “a Kazakhi desire that all damage inflicted by employees
should be borne by the organization that employs them . . . . [T]he
organization can then seek indemnity from the employee but only in
limited amounts per month or in other special situations.”280 The Ka-
zakh law probably originated in the Soviet Civil Code.281 The Kazakh
law socialized the cost of fraud within the business and refused to im-
pose personal responsibility for fraud on those who commit it.
The district court resisted the application of Kazakh law in part be-
cause Texans believe in personal responsibility:
In contrast, Texas has a strong interest in ensuring that its residents
do not perpetuate [perpetrate?] fraud on its own residents or any-
one else. To further that interest, Texas has chosen not to insulate its
residents from liability. To do otherwise would enable Texas re-
sidents to hide behind the corporate veil and discourage responsible
individual behavior.282
Is this no longer true? In Kazakh law, at least the corporation might
hold the defrauder liable, ultimately. Even that possibility of personal
responsibility disappears under the 14th’s reading of Section 21.223.
The statute is just a veil-piercing regulation:
The statute requires that liability limited by it be “on the basis of” a
veil-piercing theory—one of those named or an “other similar the-
277. As the Supreme Court of Texas said in a related context, “If that were the
case, a party could avoid tort liability to the world simply by entering into a contract
with one party.” Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 419
(Tex. 2011).
278. Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1349 (E.D.
Tex. 1993).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1350.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1351.
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ory.”283 The common law tort of fraud is not included. The context of
both Section 21.223 in the corporate code and subsections (a)(2) and
(b) within that Section strongly suggest that no exemption from tort
law was intended.
The legislative history strongly supports the statute’s veil-piercing
purpose. Nothing in that legislative history suggests anything else.
The results of reading the statute as does the 14th suggest that the
Texas Legislature intended no such reading. Such results include
• the probability that the 14th’s expanded reading will leave some
fraud unremedied and thus encourage business actors to game
the system to take advantage of a personal exemption;
• that fraud is exempted, but not negligence or other less serious
torts;
• that covered corporate actors are exempt from liability for de-
frauding their own corporations, and also exempt from indem-
nity and contribution;
• that an exemption from tort law, for those who want it, becomes
available for the price of a share; and
• that the exemption is provided so unevenly among business ac-
tors and entities.
That no good way exists to contract around the 14th’s results not
only suggests that the legislature did not intend this reading but also
shows that this reading presents an obstacle to contractual freedom.
This rule will be especially hard on smaller businesses. Who would
hire TecLogistics, Inc., now? Dresser-Rand would be much better off
hiring a larger company that would be good for its employees’ fraudu-
lent acts and is not controlled by a single individual from whom
Dresser-Rand should extract a waiver of Section 21.223 immunity
before doing business.
The lack of any good rationale in support also suggests that the leg-
islature did not intend this result.
The lack of a rationale, the removal of a disincentive to commit
fraud, and the possibility of unremedied fraud in Texas also suggest
that this new position will decrease trust, increase the cost of doing
business, and make true contractual freedom less likely and less com-
mon. The exemption also breaches the law’s obligation to hold eco-
nomic actors to the “rules of the game” necessary for economic
flourishing.
Some feel that fraud is alleged too easily and too often. Surely it is
alleged sometimes without merit, and litigating it is costly. Sorting
meritorious claims from unmeritorious claims is the role of courts,
283. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (West 2019).
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however, both the judge and the jury. Closing the courts to fraud
claims to save the cost of litigating those that are meritless surely
would cost Texas far too much.
